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Moving Beyond Cameras in the Courtroom:  
Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court 
Mary-Rose Papandrea* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
News media, legal blogs, and law reviews routinely cite a panoply of 
reasons why the Supreme Court will not permit the televising or 
videotaping of oral arguments: the Justices’ desire for anonymity,1 the 
risk that creative editing of sound bites will mislead the public,2 the risk 
that the Justices’ questions and comments will be taken out of context,3 
the need to separate the judicial process from the political branches of 
government,4 a lack of confidence in the public’s ability to understand 
the proceedings,5 and the concern that both the lawyers and the Justices 
will grandstand for the cameras.6 More cynical commentators believe 
that the Justices are reluctant to be recorded on camera because of their 
view that their branch is exceptional.7 Others suggest that the Justices 
“are simply not used to being second-guessed.”8 
 
 * Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. Thank you to Derek Bambauer, 
Elizabeth Ludwin King, Joseph Liu, Emily Meazell, Rebecca Morrow, Ronald Wright, Fred Yen, 
the Wake Forest Law School faculty, and all the participants at the BYU Law Review Symposium: 
The Press, the Public, and the U.S. Supreme Court, for their helpful comments and feedback on the 
contents of this Article. I am also grateful to Noah Hampson, Eric Lee, Jeff Locke, Ellen Melville, 
and Andy Soliman for their research assistance. 
 1. Ariane de Vogue, What Do the Supreme Court Justices Think of Cameras in Court?, 
ABC NEWS LEGAL BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2011/12/what-do-the-supreme-court-justices-think-of-cameras-in-court. 
 2. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court TV? Nice Idea, but Still Not Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2011, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/us/supreme-court-tv-still-not-likely-
sidebar.html. 
 3. Mark Memmott, Americans Want the Supreme Court to Open Up; Here’s Why It Won’t, 
NPR (Mar. 24, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/ 
2012/03/24/149235724/americans-want-the-supreme-court-to-open-up-heres-why-it-wont. 
 4. Tony Mauro, Let the Cameras Roll: Cameras in the Court and the Myth of Supreme 
Court Exceptionalism, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 259, 270 (2011). 
 5. Liptak, supra note 2. 
 6. De Vogue, supra note 1. 
 7. Mauro, supra note 4, at 259, 270–71 (arguing that the Court views itself as “a unique 
institution that can and should resist the demands of the information age”). 
 8. Adam Cohen, Why Won’t the Supreme Court Allow TV Cameras?, TIME (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://ideas.time.com/2011/11/21/why-won-the-supreme-court-allow-tv-cameras. 
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Another common explanation is that the Supreme Court has resisted 
modern communications technology because the Justices do not 
understand new technology9 and are indeed “hostile to [it].”10 As the 
Wall Street Journal Law Blog put it, “Maybe the justices are against 
cameras in the court because when they think of cameras, they think of 
those huge cameras on tripods with the cloth to cover the photographers 
and the supernova flash-bulbs.”11 Indeed, Judge Posner recently wrote 
that “the current justices have—though this is not new—a low comfort 
level with science and technology, and with complex commercial 
transactions, at a time when technology (including “financial 
engineering”) is playing an increasingly large role in culture and 
society.”12 
The goal of this Article is to examine the theory that the Court’s 
reluctance to embrace not just cameras but modern communications 
technology more generally is based on the Justices’ own lack of 
understanding of and hostility to this technology. To accomplish this 
goal, the Article considers the Justices’ use of technology in their 
personal and professional lives as well as their understanding of 
communications technology in oral argument and written opinions. First, 
the Article examines the Court’s changing use of technology to 
communicate with the press and public in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries as well as the various comments Justices have made in their 
public remarks regarding their personal understanding and use of 
technology. The Court has plainly been slow to embrace new 
 
 9. See Monica Bay, Cameras and Social Media in the Courts, L. TECH. NEWS (May 19, 
2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120249447655 3 
(summarizing comments from Manny Medrano, a litigator and legal analyst, who suggested that 
having a “media savvy judge, who is not terrified of media” was one of three conditions required for 
court proceedings to be televised properly); Carrie Dann, On ATMs, Tweets, and ‘Twitting,’ 
NBCNEWS.COM (May 21, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/ 
_news/2010/05/21/4439641-on-atms-tweets-and-twitting (reporting that some of the Justices’ recent 
statements have done little to rebut the stereotype that they are “awed and confused by technology”). 
 10. Nick Summers, Supreme Court Turns Technophile, DAILY BEAST (June 28, 2011, 12:38 
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/28/supreme-court-video-game-decision-is-rare-
tech-savvy-ruling.html. 
 11. Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 5:56 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court. 
 12. Richard A. Posner, The Court of Celebrity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 2011, at 26; see also 
Monica Harrington, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Understand Globalization, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 
21, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/monica-harrington/social-innovation-
perspectives/supreme-court-doesnt-understand-globalization (“The Supreme Court is made up of 
justices who demonstrate no understanding of how profoundly the world has changed due to changes 
in business, technology and communications.”). 
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communications technology, and the Justices’ personal use of technology 
is consistent with those in their respective peer groups. Second, the 
Article examines the Court’s understanding of communications 
technology as reflected in its oral arguments and written decisions in the 
last two decades.13 This section concludes that the Court’s resistance to 
cameras in the courtroom and other technological advances in public 
communications does not stem from ignorance of technology. By and 
large, the Court’s opinions actually indicate a remarkable understanding 
of technology. Instead, these opinions reveal that the Court is often 
cautious in the face of technological developments not because the 
Justices do not understand those developments but rather because they 
are not confident that they can predict the future of technology and the 
development of social norms that will surround its use. Furthermore, the 
Court is generally hesitant to revisit its prior decisions and pre-existing 
doctrinal framework and often chooses to issue more narrow decisions to 
avoid the difficult jurisprudential questions new technology can present. 
The third and final section of this Article concludes that the Court’s 
reluctance to embrace modern communications technology has less to do 
with its lack of understanding of that technology and more to do with its 
concerns about the modern media culture. While the Court’s resistance to 
cameras in the courtroom may diminish with time, it does not appear that 
we will see cameras at the Court anytime soon. In the meantime, rather 
than focusing solely on convincing the Court to permit cameras to record 
its proceedings, advocates for increased public access to the Court’s 
work should devote at least part of their energy to thinking beyond 
cameras to other ways in which the Court could evolve to accommodate 
the expectations of the public in a changing media environment. 
II. TECHNOLOGY AT THE COURT 
In order to understand the Court’s reluctance to use modern 
communications technology, it is helpful to take a look at the history of 
its public communications as well as the Justices’ personal use and 
understanding of communications technology. This Part demonstrates 
that throughout its history, the Court has been slow to embrace new 
 
 13. I will focus on cases involving communications technology. Depending on how one 
defines technology, it would be possible to examine the effects of technology in virtually every 
doctrinal area on the Court’s docket. For example, for a discussion of the Court’s treatment of 
technological developments at issue in its Commerce Clause cases, see Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). 
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technology. The Justices’ personal use and understanding of technology 
differs from Justice to Justice, but generally speaking it is consistent with 
the use of technology by others in their peer group. 
A. Communications with the Press and the Public 
The last several years have seen an explosive use of communications 
technology in America’s courtrooms.14 Many state courts around the 
country, including state supreme courts, permit cameras in their 
courtrooms.15 Indeed, in the state courts the issue is no longer whether 
cameras should be permitted, but what other things should be done to 
adapt to modern-day journalist and technological realities. For example, 
a pilot project in a state court in Quincy, Massachusetts, has installed 
live-streaming cameras in the courtrooms and provided free WiFi access 
to anyone who comes to the courthouse to make it easier for citizen 
journalists to cover a case.16 Several state courts around the country have 
created official Twitter pages to alert the interested public when new 
opinions or other material is posted.17 Other progressive courts have 
changed their rules to expand the definition of news media to include 
anyone who regularly disseminates information of public interest and 
permits them to make use of “pool cameras” and to transmit from the 
courtroom using cellphones, laptops, and other electronic devices.18 
 
 14. Foreign courts have also been less hesitant to embrace cameras. Liptak, supra note 2 
(noting that the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom allow 
cameras). 
 15. Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS 
ASS’N, (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://rtdna.org/article/cameras_in_the_court_a_state 
_by_state_guide_updated. 
 16. Justin Ellis, Reality TV: OpenCourt Has Begun Its Livestream of the Judicial System, 
NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (May 3, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2011/05/ reality-tv-
opencourt-has-begun-its-livestream-of-the-judicial-system. 
 17. See Florida Supreme Court Begins Using Twitter, FLA. BAR NEWS (May 1, 2010), 
http://bit.ly/fla-sup-ct-on-twitter; John P. Martin, Pa. Supreme Court to Go on Twitter, PHILLY.COM 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://bit.ly/pa-sup-ct-on-twitter. 
 18. Watch Live Video from Quincy District Court, PATRIOT LEDGER, 
http://www.patriotledger.com/homepage/breaking/x1146472520/Live-streaming-video-goes-live-
May-2-at-Quincy-District-Court (last updated Jan 8, 2013); see also Press Release, Supreme Judicial 
Court Public Information Office, News Media Registration Under SJC Rule 1:19 Now Available 
Online (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/docs/rule-119-press-release.pdf 
(announcing new rules for Massachusetts state courts permitting anyone who regularly disseminates 
matters of public interest to the public to register as a member of the news media and make use of 
the pool camera or electronic devices in the courtroom with the permission of the presiding judge). 
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom also recently began to allow tweeting from the 
courtroom. See Tweeting Allowed in Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2011, 3:42 PM), 
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Federal courts have been a bit slower to evolve their communications 
practices, but the district and appellate courts have begun to make steady 
progress. In 1972, the Judicial Conference amended the Code of Conduct 
for federal judges to add a prohibition against “broadcasting, televising, 
recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately 
adjacent thereto.”19 In 1990, the Judicial Conference recommended and 
ultimately implemented a three-year pilot program in two appellate and 
six district courts to evaluate the use of cameras in civil proceedings.20 
This pilot program led the Judicial Conference to conclude that cameras 
had intimidating effects on some jurors and witnesses and declined to 
expand the use of cameras in civil proceedings.21 Distinguishing between 
appellate and trial proceedings, the Judicial Conference permitted the 
appellate courts in 1996 to decide for themselves whether to permit 
cameras but prohibited cameras at the district court level.22 Justices 
Sonia Sotomayor,23 Samuel Alito,24 and Stephen Breyer25 have all 
supported cameras in the courts when they were judges on the circuit 
level. 
Currently, the Judicial Conference is reconsidering whether cameras 
should be permitted at the district court level and has sponsored a new 
pilot program to examine the use of cameras in fourteen federal district 
courts.26 Starting in July 2011, cameras have been permitted in civil 
cases heard before the participating courts as long as the parties 
consent.27 These recordings are made publicly available on uscourts.gov 
 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/feb/03/ tweeting-allowed-in-supreme-court. 
 19. History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov 
/Multimedia/Cameras/history.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Tony Mauro, Cameras in Court May Get Boost, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (July 16, 
2009), http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=21838 (noting that in her 
confirmation hearings Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that she supported cameras in the 
courtroom, and that her former court, the Second Circuit, had cameras in its courtroom). 
 24. Tony Mauro, Alito Well-Versed in First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 
17, 2006), http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16316 (quoting Justice Alito’s 
statements in his confirmation hearings that he had voted in favor of allowing cameras in the 
courtroom when he had served as a judge on the Third Circuit). 
 25. Matt Sundquist, Cameras and the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29, 2010, 8:17 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/cameras-and-the-supreme-court (noting how Justice 
Breyer permitted cameras into the First Circuit when he served as a judge on that court). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Robert Ambrogi, Federal Court in Boston to Announce New Rules on Cameras and 
Coverage Today, MEDIA L. (Oct. 6, 2011, 8:16 AM), http://medialaw.legaline.com/2011/ 10/federal-
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and other local participating websites to be determined in the court’s 
discretion.28 In addition, the district court in Massachusetts has 
established a “virtual press box” that gives holders of media 
identification credentials increased access to the electronic filing 
system.29 This new program will also permit members of the media to 
sign up for alerts on any new filings made in cases they choose to 
follow.30 
The highest federal court in the land has been much more reluctant to 
embrace modern information technology to communicate quickly and 
easily with the press and public. Indeed, when Chief Justice Roberts was 
asked recently about when the Court would permit cameras in the 
courtroom, he reminded his audience that “one of the architectural motifs 
on the base of our lamp posts throughout [the Supreme Court] is a turtle. 
. . . And that’s to indicate that we move slowly but surely and on a stable 
basis.”31 
At the outset, it is important to note that the current Justices 
apparently do not share a single, unified view regarding the wisdom of 
allowing cameras in the courtroom. Although retired Justice David 
Souter famously told Congress that cameras in the Supreme Court would 
roll “over my dead body,”32 some of the other Justices have publicly 
stated that they would be in favor of permitting cameras. For example, 
Justice Kagan has said, “I think it’s a good idea . . . If everybody could 
see this it would make them feel so good about this branch of 
government and how it operates.”33 That said, other Justices such as 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia have publicly 
opposed cameras, and Justice Alito, who voted in favor of cameras while 
serving as a judge on a lower federal court, is also reluctant to embrace 
cameras at the Supreme Court.34 
 
court-in-boston-to-announce-new.html. 
 28. History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, supra note 19. 
 29. Ambrogi, supra note 27. 
 30. Id. 
 31. De Vogue, supra note 1. 
 32. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says ‘Over My Dead Body,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
1996, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-
souter-says-over-my-dead-body.html. 
 33. Robin Hagan, Justice Kagan Talks Cameras in the Supreme Court, Collegiality, 
FINDLAW (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2011/08/ justice-kagan-
talks-cameras-in-the-supreme-court-collegiality.html. 
 34. Justice Alito: Few Would Watch High Court Arguments on TV, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-alito-few-would-watch-high-
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
1901 Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court 
 1907 
1. Recordings and transcripts of oral argument and opinion 
announcements; orders and opinions 
It is common knowledge that the Court has never permitted still or 
video cameras in the courtroom, either for oral argument or opinion 
announcements, regardless of the public interest in the legal issues at 
stake.35 Although for decades there has been a push for cameras in the 
courtroom, the Court has repeatedly rejected these attempts.36 The only 
step it has made in the direction of permitting cameras is a baby step at 
best; the Court permits a closed-circuit transmission of the proceedings 
to an overflow room in the courthouse.37 Justice Breyer has indicated 
that overflow transmission to other courthouses might also be a 
possibility, but that idea has not become a reality yet.38 
The Court has traditionally been slow to update its communications 
with the public to take advantage of advances in technology. For 
example, the Court took a long time after the technology was available to 
release transcripts and audio recordings of its proceedings; indeed, even 
today the Court does not make transcripts and audio recordings 
accessible as quickly as it could. The Court first made audio recordings 
of oral arguments available for archival purposes only in 1955, decades 
after the technology was available.39 Even then the Court, which 
deposited the tapes with the National Archives, did not make recordings 
available until after the Term concluded.40 After CBS broadcasted a 
portion of the oral argument in the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, the 
 
court-arguments-on-tv; Debra Cassens Weiss, Alito Warns of ‘Observer Effect’ if Courtroom 
Cameras Are Allowed, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2010, 7:51 AM), http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/alito_warns_of_observer_effect_if_courtroom_cameras_are_allowed. 
 35. In 1988, the Court permitted advocates for cameras in the courtroom to stage a 
demonstration of how cameras would work in the Supreme Court chamber. This experiment 
received little publicity; more importantly, it seemed to have little effect on the Court. Mauro, supra 
note 4, at 264–65. 
 36. Justice Souter famously said to Congress in 1996 that “the day you see a camera come 
into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.” On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter 
Says, ‘Over My Dead Body,’ supra note 32. Justice Souter’s comments echoed those of Chief Justice 
Burger a decade earlier. Howard Rosenberg, Burger’s Day in Moyers’ Court, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 
1986, at J9 (quoting Justice Burger making an over-my-dead-body comment in an earlier CBS 
interview). 
 37. See Liptak, supra note 2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Roy M. Mersky & Kumar Percy, The Supreme Court Enters the Internet Age, 63 TEX. 
B.J. 569, 569 (2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/supremect.htm. 
 40. Id. 
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Court stopped sending tapes to the National Archives for fifteen years.41 
When the Court began releasing recordings again in 1986, it required 
those who wanted to listen to them to receive permission from the Court, 
which would be granted only if the applicant promised to use them solely 
for educational and noncommercial purposes.42 Only after Peter Irons 
and Stephanie Guitton violated this agreement by publishing a selection 
of edited oral argument audiotapes and transcripts in May It Please the 
Court did the Court permit the National Archives to sell the recordings.43 
The Court waited until 2000, when it heard Bush v. Gore,44 to 
release these audio recordings to the press and the public on the same 
day they were made.45 The release of audio recordings initially rested in 
the Court’s sole discretion, which it exercised sparingly.46 During the 
2009–2010 term, the Court denied all seven media requests for same-day 
release.47 In 2010, the Court revised its policy to permit the release of the 
audio recordings for all oral arguments, but it does not release the audio 
recordings on the same day.48 Instead, it releases a week’s worth of 
arguments every Friday.49 Given that the Court never hears oral 
argument on Fridays, this new policy means that the Court does not 
routinely release audio recordings on the same day they were made.50 In 
March 2012, the Court agreed to release the audio of the oral arguments 
in the Affordable Health Care Act case on the same day,51 but the 
general Friday release policy remains in effect. 
Making use of the audio recordings can be challenging, especially 
for those not as familiar with the Court’s docket or with the Justices. It 
can be difficult for interested members of the public to find the audio 
they are looking for because the recordings are listed by case name only, 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 569–70. 
 44. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 45. Bruce G. Peabody, “Supreme Court TV”: Televising the Least Accountable Branch?, 33 
J. LEGIS. 144, 148–49 (2007). 
 46. Mauro, supra note 4, at 266. 
 47. Id. at 267. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court to Expedite Release of Audio for Health Care Arguments, 
BLOG LEGALTIMES (Mar. 16, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ blt/2012/03/supreme-
court-turns-down-video-for-health-care-arguments.html. 
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without annotation.52 Furthermore, listening to the audio can be difficult 
for someone not familiar with the voices of the individual Justices unless 
one follows along with a copy of the transcript to determine who is 
speaking.53 
The Court has also been slow to release oral argument transcripts, 
and until recently they were difficult to use. In 1996, Linda Greenhouse 
complained that it took two weeks for the Court to release the transcripts, 
even though the technology existed for the Court to release them on the 
same day.54 It was also not until 2004 that the transcripts indicated which 
Justice asked which question; instead, the transcript simply read, 
“QUESTION.”55 The Court did not begin releasing same-day transcripts 
of oral arguments until 2006.56 
The Court was slow to make its opinions electronically accessible to 
the public. Opinions and other court orders were first made electronically 
accessible in 1992 through the subscription-only HERMES Bulletin 
Board System.57 Three years later, the Court established its own bulletin 
board system to make available to the general public slip opinions and 
other items.58 In 2000, the Court established its own website.59 This 
website gives the public and press alike access to the Court’s opinions, 
argument schedule, briefs, oral argument recordings, and transcripts. The 
Court posts opinions and orders in PDF form on the website until they 
come out in the print volume of U.S. Reports. In 2010, the Court updated 
its website to provide “enhanced search capabilities.”60 The PDFs use 
optical character recognition that permits the text of the opinions to be 
easily searched, copied, and pasted. Critics have noted that one way the 
Court could improve its website is by converting the opinions and orders 
into HTML when available, with page numbers.61 In addition, the 
 
 52. Lisa T. McElroy, Cameras at the Supreme Court: A Rhetorical Analysis, 2012 BYU L. 
REV. 1837. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme 
Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1559 (1996). 
 55. Mauro, supra note 4, at 267. 
  56. Id. 
 57. Mersky & Percy, supra note 39. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName=pr_03-18-10.html. 
 61. Bradley J. Hillis, The U.S. Supreme Court Web Site: A Judicial Review, JURIST LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 29, 2000), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/courttech5.htm. 
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Court’s website does not make available audio recordings of the opinion 
announcements. Instead, such recordings are available at www.oyez.org. 
When the healthcare decision was announced in June, the millions of 
people trying to get access to the Court’s opinion on the official website 
overwhelmed the server’s capacity. As a result of this crushing demand, 
the Court was effectively unable to publish its decision on its website for 
about half an hour after the decision was announced in open court.62 This 
meant that everyone not in the courtroom was waiting for reports from 
the press to find out what had happened, and the inaccurate reporting 
from some media outlets confused a lot of people, including President 
Obama.63 
Although the Court’s website is an encouraging step in the right 
direction, the Court has not embraced the full range of communications 
technology that it could to communicate with the public. For example, 
the Court does not use Twitter, Facebook, or any other social media 
platform that would permit interested followers to receive notification 
when new material is posted. The Justices have largely deflected calls for 
the Court to embrace social media, but it appears that their opposition is 
to individual Justices using social media to communicate with the public, 
rather than the Court as an institution making use of social media to 
improve its communications. For example, Justice Sotomayor has said 
that people would find it “very unsatisfying” to interact with judges on 
social media because they cannot debate with the public in the same way 
that politicians engage with their constituents.64 Justice Breyer has 
likewise stated that he believes it would be inappropriate for the Justices 
to have followers on Twitter or friends on Facebook.65 
While it would indeed be inappropriate for the Justices to provide 
tutorials on legal issues or discuss their votes in unreleased decisions, it 
still would be possible for the Court as an institution to use social media 
to communicate with the public about what is happening at the Court. 
 
 62. Tom Goldstein, We’re Getting Wildly Differing Assessments, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 7, 
2012, 10:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/were-getting-wildly-differing-assessments. 
 63. Id. (“At the White House, there is more to the story than the spin that the President 
believed the Administration had lost the case only for a very short period of time. In fact, for at least 
a few minutes he thought the opposite and for more than five minutes, he had substantially worse 
information than many Americans.”). 
 64. Kathy Matheson, Sotomayor Visits Penn for Law School Dedication, PHILLY.COM (Apr. 
6, 2012, 6:13 AM), http://bit.ly/sotomayor-visits-penn-for-law-school-dedication. 
 65. Stephanie Francis Ward, Justice Breyer’s on Twitter and Facebook, but Don’t Count on 
Him Friending You, ABA J. (Apr. 14, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.abajournal.com 
/news/article/breyer_on_facebook_but_dont_count_on_him_friending_you. 
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
1901 Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court 
 1911 
Indeed, the Justices are aware that their work is increasingly dissected on 
websites, blogs, and social media platforms. Nonofficial sources, like 
SCOTUSblog,66 have proven to be indispensable guides to the Court’s 
work. SCOTUSblog provides real-time summaries of oral arguments and 
opinion announcements as well as a host of additional information about 
pending cases and petitions for certiorari. The Justices appear to 
welcome the attention their work has received. Justice Kennedy testified 
to Congress that it is good for social media to cover the Court’s work.67 
Although for most of the twentieth century the Justices avoided 
appearing in the broadcast media,68 in the last few decades the Justices 
have increasingly been willing to sit down for televised interviews and to 
permit audio and visual recording when they are giving speeches or 
lectures, particularly when they have a book to promote or a particular 
message they want to get out.69 In addition, in 2009 retired Associate 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor launched the website “iCivics” to educate 
young people about their government.70 The website offers a broad range 
of educational video games and activities for middle- and high-school 
students.71 The Justices’ increasing use of modern media to get out their 
own messages indicates that they are very much aware of the important 
role the media plays in our society. 
 
 66. SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Jan 26, 2013). The importance 
of SCOTUSBlog cannot be overstated. Website publisher Tom Goldstein has reported that usage 
data indicates that staff members of the Court access the website and that the site received 5.3 
million page views the day the Court released its Affordable Health Care Act decision. Mallary Jean 
Tenore, Why It’s So Hard for SCOTUSBlog to Get Supreme Court Press Credentials, POYNTER.ORG 
(Jul. 11, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/top-stories/180581/why-its-so-hard-
for-scotusblog-to-get-credentialed. 
 67. Ward, supra note 65. 
  68. In 1958, Justice Douglas became the first Justice to sit for a televised interview. RICHARD 
DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA 150 (2011). Justice 
Scalia has had the most dramatic change of heart regarding cameras. For many years, he was known 
for his vehement opposition to audio or visual recording of his public appearances—even going as 
far as confiscating reporters’ tape recorders. Id. at 172. 
  69. Id. at xiv–xv, 151 (“The justices appear to have shed their camera shyness.”). While a full 
account and summary of the Justices’ televised appearances and general relationship with the press 
is beyond the scope of this Article, interested readers should consult Davis’s book for details. In 
addition, in this symposium issue, RonNell Anderson Jones provides additional details about the 
reluctance of some Justices to engage with the media. See RonNell Anderson Jones, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices and Press Access, BYU Law Review Symposium: The Press, the Public, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
  70. What Is iCivics?, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
  71. We’ve Got Games!, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/games (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
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2. Press access 
The Supreme Court has not made it easy for the press to cover the 
Court. Its policies regarding the release of opinions, the use of 
technology in the courtroom, and press credentialing all have room for 
improvement. 
The Court releases opinions when they are completed with little 
attention to the difficulties that a crush of high-profile opinions will 
cause for the press. Until 1965, the Court released opinions only on 
Mondays.72 This practice inevitably meant that at the end of each Term 
there would be a crush of decisions coming down at once, and reporters 
and editors dealing with limited time and space had to make difficult 
decisions about which ones to cover.73 Justice Frankfurter repeatedly 
urged his colleagues to abandon the Monday-only rule in order to help 
the press coverage of the Court and prevent “public indigestion, with 
consequent misinformation and mischievous reaction to decisions.”74 
Although this change was helpful, reporters still had to deal with the 
crush of opinions that would come out at the end of each term. In 1996, 
Linda Greenhouse wrote about her frustration with the Court’s practice 
of releasing its opinions in clusters, especially in June, rather than 
spreading them out over two or three days.75 When she offered this 
suggestion to then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, he unhelpfully suggested that 
she spread out her reporting over two or three days.76 In Greenhouse’s 
opinion, the Court did not intentionally make itself “mysterious and 
remote” but rather the Court was “quite blithely oblivious to the needs of 
those who convey its work to the outside world.”77  
In recent years, the Clerk of the Court, William Suter, has tried to 
avoid the release of particularly newsworthy decisions on the same day 
as oral argument so that reporters will not face the impossible choice of 
reading and reporting the newsworthy case or listening to oral 
argument.78 Despite these efforts, reporters still continue to face this 
 
  72. DAVIS, supra note 68, at 143. 
  73. Id. 
  74. Id. 
 75. Greenhouse, supra note 54, at 1558. 
 76. Id. at 1558–59. 
 77. Id. at 1559. 
 78. Brigham Young University Law Review Symposium, The Press, the Public, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Journalist Panel (Jan. 26, 2012), www.law2.byu.edu/ 
videos_index/LawReviewSymposium%20-%20Journalist%20Panel.wmv (statement of Lyle 
Denniston). 
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Hobbesian choice any day when opinions are announced on the day of 
oral argument.79 Although even reporters recognize it is not realistic to 
expect the Court to space out its opinions to make things “easier” for the 
press corps, some have suggested that the Court could make coverage 
easier by giving the press some advance notice when opinions are 
coming so that they can review the briefs and brush up on the issues 
involved, or give reporters in “lock up” access to copies of the Court’s 
opinions at 9:30 (half an hour before they are announced in open court) 
so that they have a little extra time to read and digest the opinions before 
reporting on them.80 
Reporters at the Supreme Court are not allowed to use cell phones or 
any other electronic devices from the courtroom where decisions are 
announced. This ban means that reporters must take notes on the 
proceedings by long-hand, and they are unable to transmit information 
from the courtroom to their editors—or the public—without leaving the 
courtroom. In order to facilitate the rapid transmission of the Court’s 
decisions to the public, some reporters choose to listen to the opinion 
announcements in the Court’s Public Information Office, where live 
audio from the Court can be heard.81 Linda Greenhouse has described 
the press room as “about the size of a subway car,” and when reporters 
are awaiting the release of an opinion in a high-profile case—as they 
were for Bush v. Gore in 2000—that room can become “like the most 
crowded rush hour subway car ever.”82 In high-profile cases, additional 
reporters are often stationed on the courthouse steps waiting to do a 
stand-up interview once they hear word of the decision from their 
colleagues inside the Court or obtain a copy of the opinion from a 
runner.83 The moment the decision is announced in the courtroom, the 
staff in the Public Information Office opens a huge white box and hands 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. At the symposium, Lyle Denniston and Dahlia Lithwick appeared to endorse a lock-
up idea; Dahlia Lithwick also suggested an advance-notice policy; and Tony Mauro expressed 
concern that advance notice might disrupt the markets. 
 81. How the Court Works: News Media, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/how-the-court-work/news-media (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 82. Linda Greenhouse, Thinking about the Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 435, 435 (2002). Greenhouse also complained that the Court personnel refused to provide 
reporters with any indication about when the opinion might be released, leading them all to remain 
captive in the press room for hours while they fielded anxious calls from their editors and fought off 
starvation until a few reporters took up a collection for pizza. Id. 
 83. Goldstein, supra note 62. 
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out copies of the slip opinions. The reporters then scramble to get to their 
computers to read and report the decisions via telephone or over the 
Internet to their editors, or they rush to the Court plaza to do a “stand up” 
report.84 After the Court began posting its opinions on its website, it 
stopped e-mailing copies of the opinions to reporters because it assumed 
that reporters could get copies of the opinions online.85 As noted above, 
however, the release of the healthcare decision demonstrated that the 
website is not infallible. 
Another stumbling block in the Court’s public communications is its 
outdated press credentialing system. The Court adheres to a rather 
antiquated method of press credentialing prevalent in the nation’s 
Capital. The Court credentialing process is derivative; it requires 
applicants to already possess active congressional press credentials (or 
White House credentials, which are also derivative of congressional 
credentials). Only twenty-six journalists have permanent Court 
credentials, and the rest must use temporary day passes.86 
Obtaining congressional press credentials can be difficult—if not 
impossible—for many publications. There are two different procedures 
to obtain press accreditation in Congress, and the one required depends 
on the type of publication. For daily publications, the Senate Rules 
Committee works with the Senate Press Gallery staff to oversee the 
credentialing process for the Standing Committee of Correspondents, 
which issues the three types of congressional press passes for daily 
publications: a one-day pass, a temporary pass, and a permanent pass.87 
An applicant must be a “full-time, paid correspondent” employed by a 
news organization “whose principal business is the daily dissemination 
of original news and opinion of interest to a broad segment of the public, 
and which has published continuously for 18 months.”88 For magazines, 
 
 84. Id.; How the Court Works, supra note 81; Nick Judd, The Fast-Paced Frenzy of a Low-
Tech Supreme Court, ABC NEWS (June 28, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ OTUS/fast-
paced-frenzy-low-tech-supreme-court/story?id=16664707; Sarah Kliff, How Will You Know If 
Obamacare Still Stands Tomorrow? Probably from Lyle, WONKBLOG (June 27, 2012, 11:14 AM), 
http://bit.ly/how-you-will-know-if-obamacare-still-stands. 
 85. Goldstein, supra note 62. 
 86. Tenore, supra note 66. 
 87. Rules Governing the Press Gallery, U.S. SENATE DAILY PRESS GALLERY, 
http://www.senate.gov/galleries/daily/ rules2.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 88. Id. The rules also deem eligible full-time, paid employees of news organizations with 
“General Publications periodicals mailing privileges under U.S. postal service rules.” Id. Periodical 
publications can receive mailing privileges if they intend to distribute indefinitely and on a regular 
basis information of a general or specific nature. See U.S. POSTAL SERV., HANDBOOK DM-204 
(2002), http://about.usps.com/handbooks/dm204.pdf. 
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newsletters, nondaily newspapers, and online publications, accreditation 
is handled through the Periodical Press Gallery, which is currently 
controlled by the House (it rotates between each body periodically). New 
applicants can be deterred due to the lengthy application process, which 
can take up to a year.89 The Press Gallery undergoes a screening that 
adheres to five rules and six regulations, which mandate that applicants 
be employed by a periodical that is published for profit and is supported 
chiefly by advertising or by subscription.90 Nonprofit organizations are 
permitted to apply for credentials provided that they “operate 
independently of any government, industry, or institution” and do not 
engage “directly or indirectly” in any lobbying.91 Some blogs and 
Internet-only news outlets like Talking Points Memo, the Huffington 
Post, and the Daily Caller have been able to satisfy these standards and 
have received credentials.92 Other online-only publications may rely less 
on subscriptions or broad-based advertising for their revenue and can 
have trouble receiving credentials from Congress.93 
With a changing multimedia environment, as well as changing 
funding models for print and online resources, Congress has come under 
fire for what seems to be a byzantine and arcane accreditation process. 
Senator Kerry held a hearing on this issue in 2009, but reform efforts 
have stalled. At this hearing, Senator Kerry noted that the Standing 
Committee of Correspondent’s role in credentialing dates back to 1877 
and warned that Congress should “be careful about how we change” the 
system of accreditation to treat online reporters fairly.94 
The current credentialing system also does not account for the 
changing structure of news outlets. The best example of the current 
problems with the credentialing system is the inability of SCOTUSblog 
to obtain press credentials. For ten years, this website—begun by Tom 
Goldstein and Amy Howe as an effort to drive business to their law 
firm—has served as the go-to source for information about the Court.95 
 
 89. New Applicant Instructions, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERIODICAL PRESS 
GALLERY, http://periodical.house.gov/app-new.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 90. Rules and Regulations, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERIODICAL PRESS GALLERY, 
http://periodical.house.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Tenore, supra note 66. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Josh Stearns, The Debate Over Press Credentials, STORIFY, http://storify.com/ 
jcstearns/the-debate-over-press-credentials (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 95. Staci D. Kramer, SCOTUSblog: After a Decade, an Overnight Sensation, PAIDCONTENT 
(Jun. 29, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/06/29/scotusblog-after-a-decade-an-overnight-
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Last spring, on the day CNN and FOX famously bungled the reporting of 
the Court’s anxiously awaited health care decision,96 over a million 
readers benefited from SCOTUSblog’s careful and reliable reporting and 
legal analysis.97 The website, now sponsored by Bloomberg Law, has 
four full-time staffers, ten additional active contributors, and over 100 
experts who contribute at least one piece during the Court’s Term.98 
Ironically, despite the crucial role SCOTUSblog plays in informing 
the public, it cannot obtain a press pass for its reporters to enter the 
courtroom to hear oral argument and the announcement of decisions. 
Although its reporter Lyle Dennison has a press pass, this is only because 
he also works for WBUR in Boston and is able to obtain a press pass as a 
result of that affiliation.99 Senate Press Gallery Director Joe Keenan has 
said that the problem for SCOTUSblog is the requirement that the 
applicant not be involved in any lobbying or paid advocacy or promotion 
work before Congress or any federal government department.100 Keenan 
reported that in June 2010 his office concluded that the website was not 
completely separate from the law firm where Goldstein and a number of 
other authors for the website practiced.101 Goldstein contests this 
explanation, however. He recently stated that he was told the website 
should not bother applying for press credentials because it was not 
supported by advertising or subscriptions.102  
Although it seems clear that SCOTUSblog should receive permanent 
press credentials, it will not necessarily be easy for Congress to 
determine, in our rapidly changing media environment, who or what 
constitutes “the press.”103 It is enough for purposes of this Article to 
 
sensation. 
 96. Paul Farhi, Early Reports on Health-Care Decision from CNN, Fox Overturned One 
Mandate: Accuracy, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), http://wapo.st/WaUOaO. 
 97. See Rebecca Rosen, Internet Gone Wild! SCOTUSblog Explodes with Health-Care 
Enthusiasm, ATLANTIC (Jun. 28, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://bit.ly/internet-gone-wild-SCOTUSblog. 
 98. Dan Diamond, Regardless of ObamaCare Decision, SCOTUSblog Has Already Won, 
FORBES (Jun. 24, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2012/06/ 24/regardless-
of-obamacare-decision-scotusblog-has-already-won. 
 99. Tenore, supra note 66. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. For a more extensive discussion of the difficulties of defining what constitutes “the 
press,” see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 564–84 (2007) (discussing the various approaches that statutes, courts, and commentators 
have taken in defining who can invoke the reporter’s privilege); see also David A. Anderson, 
Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 436–46 (2002) (discussing the various approaches taken 
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note, however, that something is clearly wrong with a credentialing 
system that excludes one of the best sources of information about the 
Supreme Court. 
B. Justices’ Personal Use of New Technology 
The Justices are not as technologically ignorant as many have 
depicted. Although their formal communications with each other remain 
quaintly old-fashioned, increasingly the Justices are using modern 
technology in both their professional and personal lives. None of the 
Justices appears to be a technophile, but they do seem to be just about as 
familiar with technology as anyone their ages might be. 
At the Court, the Justices still retain traditional methods of 
communicating with each other. The Justices do not use e-mail to 
circulate draft opinions or to indicate their “joins,” suggestions for 
revision, or plans to write separately; instead, they rely on their chamber 
aides to carry hard copies of whatever the Justices wish to communicate 
with other chambers.104 This respect for tradition and ritual permeates 
much of what occurs at the Court.105  
The Court was rather slow in getting Internet access and remains 
very concerned about cybersecurity. When the Court decided to provide 
access to the Internet in 2002, it went so far as to install an additional 
computer at each desk for this purpose.106 To this day the Court 
maintains two terminals at each desk with a switch that allows users to 
alternate between the systems.107 The Court also maintains two separate 
e-mail systems; one operates only internally within the Court, and the 
other that operates externally.108 This cumbersome approach effectively 
 
to defining “the press”). 
 104. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Justices Don’t Communicate by Email, Kagan Says, ABA J. 
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justices_dont_communicate_by_ 
email_kagan_says (reporting Justice Kagan’s remarks that while the Supreme Court clerks use e-
mail to talk to each other, the Justices “ignore 25 years of technology” and “prefer to communicate 
via hand-delivered memos”); see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 231 (2001) 
(mentioning the use of aides to carry communications to other chambers). 
 105. See McElroy, supra note 52, at [[19–23]] (describing in detail the various traditions and 
rituals at the Court). 
 106. E-mail from Linda Stout, Secretary of Justice Souter, to Mary-Rose Papandrea, Assoc. 
Professor, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. (Nov. 12, 2012) (on file with author). From my own experience as a 
law clerk in 1997, I remember the internal-only e-mail system. 
 107. Id. 
 108. E-mail from Linda Stout, Secretary of Justice Souter, to Mary-Rose Papandrea, Assoc. 
Professor, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. (Nov. 21, 2012) (on file with author). 
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walls off the Court’s internal e-mail system from the outside world and 
protects the Court’s documents from hackers. 
Although the Justices hew strongly to traditions and rituals of the 
Court, the way they do their work has been evolving with the times. To 
be sure, some Justices are slower to evolve than others. Justice Souter, 
who retired in 2009, famously refused to use a computer, much less the 
Internet or social media. Although he has said that he now owns a Kindle 
and has used an iPad, he does not appear very comfortable with the 
devices. Indeed, at a recent Harvard reunion, he entertained his former 
classmates with a story about how he tried to use an iPad.109 He said it 
was “terrific,” “until he found he couldn’t turn it off, and had to place it 
in a bathroom with the door closed.”110 Chief Justice Roberts, who at 
fifty-eight years old is over two decades younger than Justice Souter, 
says he knows how to use a computer but prefers to write his opinions 
out by long hand. He explains that he was “just a couple years too late” 
to learn how to use a computer to write because the “technological 
revolution was slightly behind [him]” when he was in college and law 
school.111 But age does not always determine technological proficiency. 
Justice Stevens, who retired from the Court in 2007 at the age of ninety, 
was reportedly at least as computer-savvy as his clerks and was using a 
computer as far back as the early 1990s.112 
When it comes to reading briefs, conducting legal research, and 
writing opinions, many of the Justices are increasingly embracing new 
technology. Justice Scalia said he uses his computer so much that he can 
 
 109. Elaine McArdle, Justices Breyer and Souter Reminisce on Law School and High Court 
Experience, HARV. L. SCH. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/alumni-
pursuits/breyer-and-souter-reminisce.html. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Supreme Court Project: Interview by Susan Swain with John Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Wash., D.C. (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/clip/678298 (a transcript of this interview may be found at 
http://supremecourt.c-span.org/assets/pdf/JRoberts.pdf); Contra Supreme Court Project: Interview 
by Susan Swain with Sonia Sotomayor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in Wash., D.C. (C-
SPAN television broadcast Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.c-spanarch 
ives.org/program/BreyerT (Justice Sotomayor saying that she uses a computer to draft her opinions) 
(a transcript of this interview may be found at http://supremecourt.c-span.org/ 
assets/pdf/SSotomayor.pdf). 
 112. Timothy B. Lee, Farewell, Stevens: The Supreme Court Loses Its Cryptographer, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 28, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/06/the-supreme-court-
loses-its-cryptographer/2; Tony Mauro, You Can Thank (or Curse) Stevens for Internet Freedom, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2010, 4:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ news/opinion/forum/2010-04-21-
column21_ST1_N.htm. 
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“hardly write in longhand anymore.”113 Justices Scalia and Kagan 
confessed to using an iPad and Kindle, respectively, to read legal 
briefs.114 As Justice Kagan has explained, there can be upwards of fifty 
briefs for a single case. “So there is a lot of reading,” she said. “And you 
know that’s a big part of the job and if a Kindle or an iPad can make it 
easier, that’s terrific.”115 Scalia has also indicated that “[w]hen he has to 
take materials home for work, he uses a thumb drive, or accesses the 
Court computer system remotely.”116 Scalia has said, “I don’t have to 
schlep the briefs around. Oh, it’s a brave new world.”117 
Scholarly attention is recently focusing on the Court’s use of the 
Internet to conduct legal research,118 although it is often unclear whether 
it is the Justices themselves doing this research or whether it is the law 
clerks or other court personnel. Over a decade ago, Fred Schauer and 
Virginia Wise’s research revealed that the Court’s access to Lexis and 
Westlaw correlated with the Court’s increased citation to “nonlegal” 
authorities, like magazines and newspapers.119 Now that online research 
extends far beyond legal databases, Justices are frequently finding—and 
citing—a broad range of authorities on the web, from highly prestigious 
and reputable journals and newspapers, “to blog posts, sporting 
magazines, interest group websites, and (in lower courts) even to 
Wikipedia.”120 Scholars have noted that the Court’s reliance on 
“Google” searches is potentially disconcerting because it may amount to 
fact-finding outside of the official record of a case, without input from 
the parties or challenge from expert opinion.121 
Although it appears that most of the Justices now regularly use a 
computer to do their work and conduct research online—and some 
 
 113. David Lat, Justice Scalia at the Federalist Society Fête, ABOVETHELAW.COM (Nov. 20, 
2010), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/11/justice-scalia-at-the-federalist-society-fete. 
 114. Jan Crawford, Kagan’s Kindle v. Scalia’s iPad, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504564_162-20025455-504564.html. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Lat, supra note 113. 
 117. Robert Barnes, Scalia on Cameras, Retirement and the ‘Brave New World,’ WASH. POST 
(Nov. 19, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/11/19/AR2010111903067.html. 
 118. See Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 
(2012). 
 119. Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of 
Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 497 (2000). 
 120. Larsen, supra note 118, at 1300. 
 121. Id. at 1301–05. 
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Justices even use modern devices like iPads, iPods, and smart 
phones122—the Justices’ personal use and understanding of modern 
communications technology is hardly cutting edge. For example, Justice 
Scalia—who appears to be one of the more technologically savvy of the 
bunch123—does not appear to be familiar with Twitter. When asked at a 
Senate Judiciary Committee meeting about whether he has ever 
considering tweeting, Scalia responded, “I don’t even know what it is. 
I’ve heard it talked about.”124 He added that his wife’s pet name for him 
is “Mr. Clueless.”125 Justice Breyer’s public statements indicate that he 
is more familiar with Twitter, revealing that he learned about the role of 
Twitter in the Iranian uprisings from his son—on the other hand, he has 
referred to tweets as “twitters.”126 Chief Justice Roberts has stated that 
he is not entirely sure what Twitter is.127 
The Justices’ apparently unfamiliarity with Twitter seems to reflect 
their lack of experience with social networking more generally. In June 
2011, Chief Justice Roberts said that he does not believe any members of 
the Court have a Facebook page,128 but Justice Breyer told a 
congressional committee just two months earlier that he uses Facebook 
to communicate with his family.129 Although Chief Justice Roberts does 
not use Facebook himself, he appears to be very aware of its potential 
dangers: he instructs incoming clerks to refrain from posting updates 
about work on their social media accounts lest they inadvertently reveal 
confidential information about the Court.130 Justice Breyer has revealed 
that he watched the movie The Social Network and “couldn’t even 
 
 122. In 2007, Justice Thomas indicated that a number of the Justices used Blackberries. Fin. 
Servs. & Gen. Gov’t Appropriations for 2008: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. 
Gov’t Appropriations: of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) (statement of 
Clarence Thomas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court). 
 123. Crawford, supra note 114 (reporting Justice Scalia’s comments that he uses an iPad to 
read legal briefs and loads classical music onto his iPod). 
 124. Dann, supra note 9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (quoting Justice Breyer as saying that his son introduced him to Twitter during the 
Iranian election protests, and he read “Twitters” from Iranians for two hours). 
 127. Emil Protalinski, US Supreme Court: We’re Not on Facebook, What’s Twitter?, ZDNET 
(June 28, 2011, 6:06 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/us-supreme-court-were-not-on-
facebook-whats-twitter/1756 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as saying he does not believe anyone at 
the Court tweets, “whatever that is”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Ward, supra note 65. During his congressional appearance, Justice Breyer referred to the 
world’s most popular social networking site as “the Facebook.” Id. 
 130. Protalinski, supra note 127. 
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understand [it],”131 although it is not clear what exactly he could not 
understand. 
What we can glean about the Justices’ use of technology indicates 
that it is consistent with what we might expect from people their age. The 
current active Justices’ ages range from fifty-two (Justice Kagan) to 
seventy-nine (Justice Ginsburg). Justices Sotomayor (fifty-eight), Alito 
(sixty-two), and Thomas (sixty-four), as well as Chief Justice Roberts 
(fifty-seven), are on the younger end of the spectrum; Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Breyer are in their mid-70s.132 The Pew Research Center 
reports that as of April 2012, 53% of American adults ages sixty-five and 
older use the Internet or e-mail. Among adults ages fifty to sixty-four, 
77% use the Internet. “As of February 2012, one-third (34%) of internet 
users ages 65 and older use social networking sites such as Facebook, 
and 18% do so on a typical day.”133 Only 14% of adults ages fifty to 
sixty-four own a tablet computer and only 16% own an e-reader.134 A 
significant number of older adults use Facebook, MySpace, or 
LinkedIn—51% of adults between the ages of fifty to sixty-four and 33% 
of those over sixty-five years old135—but much smaller percentages of 
older adults use Twitter. A recent Pew survey reports that only 9% of 
adults between the ages of fifty to sixty-four and 4% of adults over sixty-
five use Twitter.136 
Indeed, the Justices may be more familiar with technology than 
many older adults because their law clerks help educate them. Justices 
Thomas and Kennedy have publicly noted that the clerks bring their 
technological knowledge to the Court and push for better technology 
with which to do their jobs.137 This is not encouraging, however, to those 
 
 131. Nitasha Tiku, Justice Breyer Confounded by Watching The Social Network, DAILY 
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 17, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2010/11/ 
justice_breyer_thoroughly_conf.html. 
 132. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUP. CT., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 133. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, OLDER 
ADULTS AND INTERNET USE, at 2 (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/ 
media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Older_adults_and_internet_use.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 7. 
 135. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 65% OF 
ONLINE ADULTS USE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES, at 4 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://pewinternet 
.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP-SNS-Update-2011.pdf. 
 136. AARON SMITH & JOANNA BRENNER, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TWITTER USE 
2012, at 3 (May 31, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports 
/2012/PIP_Twitter_Use_2012.pdf. 
 137. Mersky & Percy, supra note 39, at 569. 
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commentators who have argued that members of the Supreme Court need 
to be more than minimally familiar with the modern communications 
technology that plays such an important role in our society.138 In 
addition, perhaps more important than a detailed understanding of the 
relevant technology is an understanding of the social norms relating to 
that technology.139  
III. THE COURT’S RECORD IN CASES INVOLVING COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY 
One way of examining the Court’s reluctance to embrace new 
communications technology is by what the Court has said about 
technology during oral arguments and in its decisions. If the Court does 
not understand technology, or exhibits some sort of reluctance to engage 
with technology, that might help us understand why as an institution it is 
so reluctant to embrace technology to communicate with the public. My 
cursory review of cases involving new technology—primarily First and 
Fourth Amendment cases, as well as copyright cases—reveals that by the 
time the Court issues an opinion, it demonstrates an admirable 
understanding of the technology at issue. At the same time, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court tends to be very cautious in cases 
involving new technology and frequently issues narrow decisions. In 
First Amendment cases, the Court as a whole has become increasingly 
hostile to arguments in favor of new medium-specific First Amendment 
standards and shows little deference to legislative findings in the face of 
developing technologies. The Court’s First Amendment decisions can 
 
 138. See Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties at the Court Causing a “Disregard of 
Duty”?, 3 J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that it is “crucial for our most important 
decision-makers, Supreme Court Justices, to have at least a rudimentary understanding of 
technologies most Americans cannot imagine living without”); Arthur Bright, A Plea for a Tech-
Savvy Justice, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/plea-tech-savvy-justice; Brett Trout, The United States 
Supreme Court v. Technology, BLAWGIT (Apr. 20, 2010), http://blawgit.com/2010/04 /20/the-
united-states-supreme-court-v-technology (arguing that it is “imperative that courts fully inform 
themselves” not only about the technologies at issue in the case but also about technology as a 
whole). Richard Baum has suggested that term limits for Supreme Court Justices might help 
alleviate this problem. Richard Baum, The Founding Fathers v. The Supreme Court, REUTERS (May 
19, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/gregg-easterbrook/2010/05/19 /the-founding-fathers-v-the-
supreme-court (“Term limits further would prevent the Supreme Court from being a geriatric 
institution whose members are out of touch with the country’s culture and concerns.”). 
 139. Grabowski, supra note 138, at 10 (quoting Rebecca Tushnet as arguing that it is perhaps 
even more important for the Court to understand “how different social groups experience the 
world”). 
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
1901 Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court 
 1923 
also be characterized as cautious, however, in that they reflect a 
reluctance to change and a steadfast commitment to protecting speech in 
the face of uncertainty. 
A. Cases the Court Doesn’t Decide 
Before considering how the Court treats technology in its decisions, 
it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the cases involving new 
technology that the Court does not decide. The Court often engages in 
the “avoidance” method when it comes to new technology. Often when 
the Court finally decides an issue involving new technology, it is only 
after decades have passed.140 For example, the Court waited almost six 
decades after the invention of the telephone to address the Fourth 
Amendment implications of wiretaps141—and ultimately ended up 
reversing its decision almost forty years later.142 Less dramatically, the 
Court did not address the use of pen registers until 1979 even though 
they had been in use since the 1960s.143 
Currently the Court has failed to provide guidance on a number of 
importance legal issues involving new technology, despite disagreement 
in the lower courts. Although we cannot know for certain why the Court 
has decided to deny cert in a number of areas involving new technology, 
it does appear that the Court prefers to wait to take on these issues until it 
feels the lower courts have had ample opportunity to consider the cases 
and the technology has evolved sufficiently. These delays can be 
maddening as circuit splits develop, and the issues cry out for resolution. 
For example, the Court has declined to address whether the First 
 
 140. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 869 (2004) (pointing out that the Court did 
not address the constitutionality of pen registers until 1979 even though they had been in widespread 
use by the 1960s, and noting how long it took the Court to address wiretapping in the first place). To 
be sure, there are instances when the Court did not hesitate to decide issues involving new 
technology before the technology—and the social norms surrounding them—had fully developed. 
The Court’s decisions in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), are two examples. A 
comprehensive review of the Court’s certiorari decisions is beyond the scope of this Article, but it 
might be that the Court feels more pressure to resolve cases involving new technology when lower-
court rulings threaten business interests and less pressure when cases involve individual rights. But 
see Ronald Wright, The Abruptness of Acton, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 401, 401–07 (2000) (noting that the 
Court decided cases addressing the constitutionality of student drug testing before the practice was 
widespread and before lower courts had much opportunity to address the issue). 
 141. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 143. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also Kerr, supra note 140. 
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Amendment limits the ability of schools to punish students for their 
online expression.144 Although a circuit split has emerged on this issue, 
the Court is no doubt concerned that it remains too soon to weigh in on 
an issue where the technology is changing so rapidly. The Court has also 
failed to take on any cases involving personal jurisdiction based on 
Internet contacts145—even though the issue has been brewing since the 
mid-1990s.  
 Although I have not undertaken a systematic review of the Court’s 
cert denials to determine how many other times and in which contexts 
the Court has declined the opportunity to review cases involving new 
technology, it is plain from the few cases that the Court has resolved 
involving technology and new media that the Court has not been 
aggressive in this area. This uncertainty may be unsettling to litigants 
(and anyone else who attempts to structure their conduct in light of the 
relevant legal rules). In some cases, the Court’s caution may be justified, 
at least up to a point. For example, it may have been wise for the Court to 
hold off on resolving a case involving personal jurisdiction based on 
Internet contacts given how much the technology has changed in the 
many years since the first courts decided Internet jurisdiction cases in the 
mid-1990s.146  
Indeed, the Court may be reluctant to take on cases involving new 
technology out of fear that any opinion it may issue will be outdated 
within a few years. As Professor Stuart Benjamin has noted, “Rapidly 
changing facts weaken the force of stare decisis by undermining the 
stability of precedents. Appellate opinions are only as robust as the facts 
on which they are based. When those facts evaporate, the opinion on 
which they rest is weakened as well.”147  
Indeed, as Benjamin has demonstrated, the facts can change so 
quickly that the record developed at the trial level is stale by the time the 
 
 144. Bill Mears, High Court Rejects Appeals on Public Prayers, Student Speech, CNN (Jan. 
17, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-17/us/us_scotus-appeals_1_appeals-court-stud ent-
speech-high-court. 
 145. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011). 
 146. E.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (setting 
forth a highly influential—but now outmoded—test for personal jurisdiction based on Internet 
contacts). 
 147. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts 
and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999). 
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case reaches the Supreme Court.148 For example, in Reno v. ACLU,149 
which struck down attempts to regulate indecency on the Internet, the 
district court had made a factual finding that age verification was not 
possible on the Internet, but by the time the case made its way to the 
Court, such services had proliferated.150 In addition, the government in 
Reno attempted to rely on the Court’s prior ruling in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation151 to support the Internet indecency regulations, arguing that 
the Internet invaded the home in the same way broadcast television did. 
The Court rejected that argument, relying on the district court’s holding 
that Internet communications do not appear on an individual’s computer 
“unbidden.”152 By the time the Court had decided the opinion, however, 
the technology had changed and “push” technology had been developed 
that requires no action from the user to receive information.153 Similarly, 
in Ashcroft v. ACLU, in which the Court considered, among other things, 
the effectiveness of filtering technology, the Court noted that “the factual 
record does not reflect current technological reality—a serious flaw in 
any case involving the Internet.”154 
Scholars have lively debates about what the Court should do in the 
face of constantly changing technology. One possibility would be simply 
not to take any cases that involve new technology, at least until things 
have settled down and no substantial change is going to take place. This 
avoidance approach can be frustrating for litigants, and in cases 
involving arguments that a statute is unconstitutional, it can have the 
effect of yielding too much power to the legislative branches.155 In 
addition, it is difficult to declare with any degree of certainty that a 
certain type of technology will not change or develop in any meaningful 
way in the future, or, perhaps more importantly, that the common use 
and societal attitudes toward any particular technology will not continue 
to change or develop.156 
 
 148. Id. at 290–96 (discussing the changes in technology between the trial court decision and 
the issuance of the Court’s opinion). 
 149. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 150. Benjamin, supra note 147, at 291–92. 
 151. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 152. Benjamin, supra note 147, at 293. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004). 
 155. Benjamin, supra note 147, at 309. 
 156. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (stating that it is 
important to proceed cautiously in cases involving new technology given not only the potential for 
changes in the technology but also the social norms relating to that technology). 
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As much as we might want resolution of new legal issues, early 
intervention from the Court might result in decisions based on imperfect 
understanding of the communications environment. Waiting for the 
technology to develop, for cultural understandings regarding that 
technology to take root, and for the lower courts to weigh in with their 
views is prudent.157 Furthermore, as Lyrissa Lidsky points out in her 
essay for this Symposium, new media might be better off without the 
Court’s intervention.158 In addition, in all areas of the law the Court 
wants to be sure that when it grants a petition for certiorari, the case is a 
good “vehicle” for deciding the issues that have divided the lower courts. 
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, regardless of whether 
the Court’s avoidance approach is justifiable, there can be no doubt that 
the Court is very cautious about taking cases that involve new 
technology. 
B. Oral Argument 
Journalists and bloggers have often poked fun at the Justices for their 
questions during oral arguments in cases regarding technology. Because 
oral argument is largely unscripted, it is not surprising that the public has 
a chance to get a glimpse of the Justices’ true feelings for and 
understanding of technology. 
The Justices were somewhat recently ridiculed about the questions 
they asked during oral argument in City of Ontario v. Quon,159 which 
addressed whether a police department violated its employee’s privacy 
rights when it examined personal text messages sent from a device 
owned by the department.160 In the case, Sergeant Jeff Quon and three 
other plaintiffs, including his wife and mistress, were employed with the 
Ontario police department and sued the Chief of Police for reading 
sexually explicit messages that were sent via pagers provided by the 
department.  
During oral argument, the Justices asked a number of questions that 
 
 157. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1752 (1995) (“[The 
Court] should do everything it can to stand back from deciding these conflicts until the nature of 
these conflicts is well mapped, well constructed, well understood.”). 
 158. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819. 
 159. See, e.g., Toby Harnden, US Supreme Court Needs Technology Tuition, TELEGRAPH 
(Apr. 22, 2010, 12:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/ 
usa/7617031/US-Supreme-Court-needs-technology-tuition.html. 
 160. Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 5:56 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court. 
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appeared to reveal their struggle to understand the technology at issue. 
For example, Chief Justice John Roberts asked what the difference was 
“between a pager and e-mail.”161 In his defense, his question may have 
been directed at determining whether a workplace policy that protected 
the privacy of an employee’s e-mails would also encompass a right of 
privacy for messages sent on pagers.162  
Other questions the Justices asked are less easily explained. Chief 
Justice Roberts asked what would happen if a text message was sent to 
an officer at the same time he was sending one to someone else: “[D]oes 
the one kind of trump the other, or do they get a busy signal?”163 In 
addition, Roberts stated that he would not have known about the role of a 
service provider routing the messages from the sender to the recipient: “I 
wouldn’t think that [some company was going to have to process the 
message]. I thought, you know, you push a button; it goes straight to the 
other thing.”164 Justice Scalia—perhaps simply attempting to get a 
laugh—echoed the Chief’s comment and remarked, “You mean it 
doesn’t go right to the other thing?”165 Shortly thereafter Justice Scalia 
made another comment that may have been a joke—or may indicate his 
unfamiliarity with pagers: “Could Quon print these . . . spicy 
conversations out and circulate them among his buddies?”166 
Notably, the Justices were not the only ones who seemed to struggle 
to understand the technology at issue in Quon. Dieter Dammeier, the 
lawyer for police officer Quon, stumbled when he was asked whether the 
officers had any ability to delete the messages permanently after they had 
been sent so that the police department would not be able to retrieve 
them later from the wireless carrier. At first, when Justice Alito asked 
him whether an officer can delete messages so that they cannot be 
 
 161. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 08–1332), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1332.pdf. 
 162. That said, Chief Justice Roberts has made other comments at oral argument that reveal 
his discomfort with new technology. Although this Article does not address the Court’s 
understanding of technology in patent cases, it is worth noting that in one patent case, Chief Justice 
Roberts asked, “If you punched in in [sic] your search station, you know, give me all the bakers in 
Washington, would that be patentable?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-964.pdf.  It is unclear whether he intended to say “search 
engine” instead of “search station.” Because Chief Justice Roberts does not use his computer for 
word processing, it is entirely possible that he regards his computer as a “search station.” 
 163. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 44. 
 164. Id. at 49. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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recovered, the lawyer responded, “Sure. Yes. . . . They can delete them. 
Just like if they received a letter, they could be put in the shredder.”167 
When Justice Alito asked him a few moments later whether he was sure 
about whether officers could delete the messages permanently, 
Dammeier admitted, “Honestly, I’m not–that’s not in the record, and 
the–how that pager works as far as deleting, I couldn’t be certain that it 
would be deleted forever.”168 
The Justices have asked memorable questions in various other cases 
that reveal their lack of experience with technology. For example, in a 
recent violent video game case, Justice Kennedy asked the California 
Attorney General why V-chips would not be sufficient to give parents 
the ability to control what violent video games their children play.169 The 
lawyer correctly responded that “the V-chip is limited to television.”170 
Justice Kennedy was also ridiculed when he indicated in the Citizens 
United oral argument that Kindle readers received their content from 
satellites (rather than wireless cellular networks).171 In Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Justice Souter admitted that he did 
not use an iPod, but he nevertheless revealed he was well aware how that 
device could be put to legitimate—and illegitimate—uses:  
I may not understand what people are doing out there, but it’s certainly 
not clear to me. I know perfectly well I could go out and buy a CD and 
put it on my iPod, but I also know perfectly well that if I can get the 
music on the iPod without buying the CD, that’s what I’m going to do. 
And I think it’s reasonable to suppose that everyone else would guess 
that.172 
It is clear that at least some of the Justices carefully read the 
advocates’ briefs and lower court opinions when they are trying to 
understand the communications medium under consideration. In the 
 
 167. Id. at 51. 
 168. Id. at 53. 
 169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 
(2011) (No. 08–1448), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ transcripts/08-
1448.pdf. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (No. 08–205), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument _transcripts/08-
205.pdf. 
 172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04–480), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf. 
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recent violent video games case, Justice Kagan asked the Attorney 
General for California, who was arguing that the state’s restrictions on 
the sale of certain violent video games to minors was constitutional, what 
other violent video games would be covered under the statute because 
the only game explicitly mentioned in the California brief was “Postal 
2.”173 In that same case, Chief Justice Roberts noted in the oral argument 
that some violent video games involve “people actively hitting 
schoolgirls over the head with a shovel so they’ll beg with mercy, being 
merciless and decapitating them, shooting people in the leg so they fall 
down—I’m reading from the district court description—pour gasoline 
over them, set them on fire, and urinate on them.”174 
The public’s expectations for the Justices’ understanding of new 
technology are so low that when any of them demonstrates that they “get 
it,” the media covering the Court goes crazy. Perhaps the best example of 
this came in the violent video game case, where Justice Kagan got a 
laugh out of a crowd and significant media attention175 when she asked 
the California Attorney General whether the statute at issue would cover 
Mortal Kombat, adding that it is “an iconic game, which I’m sure half of 
the clerks who work for us spent considerable amounts of time in their 
adolescence playing.”176 Shockingly, the lawyer responded that he was 
not very familiar with that particular game.177 Oral argument attendees 
and the press also enjoyed Justice Scalia’s resistance to California’s 
arguments, where he was quick to respond to the argument that the 
statute covered only “deviant” video games—“As opposed to what? A 
normal violent video game?” he asked.178 In addition, Justice Scalia 
contended at oral argument that California was making the same 
argument—that depictions of violence are somehow worse than ever 
before and therefore entitled to less First Amendment protection—that 
comes up whenever there is new technology.179 
In perhaps the most entertaining oral argument in recent memory, the 
 
 173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 12. 
 174. Id. at 33. 
 175. See Joan Biskupic, Kagan Offers Practicality to Arguments, Settles in as New Justice, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2010, 6:25 PM), http://usat.ly/Wn1NOg; Nina Totenberg, The Robe Seems to 
Suit New Justice Kagan, NPR (Dec. 27, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/27/132109642/the-robe-seems-to-suit-new-justice-kagan. 
 176. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 58–59. 
 177. Id. at 59. 
 178. Id. at 4. 
 179. Id. at 7–8. 
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Court considered whether the FCC’s ban on fleeting expletives in 
broadcast media was constitutional despite dramatic changes in 
communications technology since the Court’s Pacifica decision in 1973. 
Justice Kennedy asked Solicitor General Don Verilli whether he was 
arguing that it is still important to have a small segment of the media that 
is not “vulgar,” even though most people do not know which channels 
are cable and which are broadcast.180 Justice Kennedy also noted that the 
V-Chip was not sufficient to protect children from indecency, stating 
“And, of course, you ask your 15-year-old, or your 10-year-old, how to 
turn off the chip. They’re the only ones that know how to do it.”181 
Justice Ginsburg provided a reality check about minors’ exposure to 
vulgarity: “I think that children—that children are not going to be 
shocked by [expletives] the way they might have been a generation ago” 
because they are hearing them on the street, from their big brothers.182 
They are “in common parlance today.”183 Even Justice Alito was aware 
of how broadcast television had changed: “Well, broadcast TV is . . . 
living on borrowed time. It’s not going to be long before it goes the way 
of vinyl records and eight-track tapes.”184 
The Justices have frequently expressed their concerns about the 
capabilities of new technology in cases involving Fourth Amendment 
challenges. The oral argument in United States v. Jones illustrated these 
concerns most dramatically (and the various published opinions in the 
case, discussed below, reflected their unease). There, in a case 
challenging the constitutionality of GPS monitoring of a criminal suspect 
where George Orwell’s 1984 was mentioned at least six times, the far-
reaching potential for intrusive monitoring gradually dawned on the 
Justices. Early in the argument, the Justices seemed horrified to hear the 
lawyer for the United States concede that under his theory of the case, 
the government could install GPS devices on the Justices’ vehicles to 
track their movements.185 After the government lawyer explained what 
 
 180. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 
(2012) (No. 10–1293), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tra nscripts/10-
1293.pdf (“Just because it’s an important symbol for our society that we aspire to a culture that’s not 
vulgar in—in a very small segment?”). 
 181. Id. at 19. 
 182. Id. at 23. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 32. 
 185. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 
10–1259), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/1012 59.pdf. 
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
1901 Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court 
 1931 
information a GPS collects, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern about 
the ability to determine whether someone was speeding with a click of 
the mouse.186 Justice Breyer pressured the government to address his 
concerns about “what would a democratic society look like” if the 
government were tracking its citizens every hour of the day.187 When the 
government’s lawyer responded that the Court should put off for another 
day consideration of “the so-called 1984 scenarios” like the one Justice 
Breyer offered, Justice Sotomayor interrupted him to note that the 
potential for such monitoring was already there.188 She explained that 
the cost of GPS units is relatively low, and that many cars today already 
come with GPS installed.189 
The Justices also asked the defendant’s lawyer some difficult 
questions about how to articulate his standard in light of the current and 
future state of technology. For example, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan 
asked the lawyer to distinguish GPS units from surveillance cameras, 
against which his client would have no Fourth Amendment defense.190 
With some hesitation, Justice Kagan noted that in London, “I’m told—
maybe this is wrong, but I’m told” the police can piece together pictures 
from surveillance cameras and track someone’s movements.191 (Justice 
Kennedy pursued a similar line of questioning but instead referred to the 
traffic cameras mounted at intersections through this country.192)  
Unmoved by the respondent’s frequent urging that the Court decide 
the case on narrow trespass grounds, Justice Kagan asked him how the 
Court should deal with GPS surveillance that does not involve a physical 
trespass but instead relies on the GPS system installed in the car.193 
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor pressed the lawyer to provide a legal rule 
that would address not just the case before the court but also the near-
future capabilities of surveillance technology.194 This time she noted the 
ability of satellites to “hone in on your home on a block in a 
neighborhood” and how it is not far off into the future when these 
 
 186. Id. at 22–23. 
 187. Id. at 24. 
 188. Id. at 25. 
 189. Id. at 25–26. 
 190. Id. at 36. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 47. 
 193. Id. at 46. 
 194. Id. at 39–40. 
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1932 
satellites will be capable of tracking people’s movements.195 Even 
Justice Alito took part in the what-about-the-future game with a specific 
reference to communications technology. He asked the respondent about 
the reasonable expectation of privacy ten years from now when “90 
percent of the population will be using social networking sites, and they 
will have on average 500 friends, and they will have allowed their 
friends to monitor their location 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, through 
the use of their cell phones.”196 
As they did in Jones, the Justices commonly use oral argument as a 
time to learn more about the relevant technology from the advocates as 
well as to explore the ramifications any ruling they might issue will have. 
For example, in Kyllo v. United States, a Fourth Amendment cases 
involving thermal imaging of a house, the Justices asked several 
questions about how thermal imaging works, what information it can 
collect, and how that information differs from the information available 
from utility records or from that which might be available without the 
use of technology.197 These types of questions indicate that lawyers 
appearing before the Court play an important role in educating the 
Justices about technology. 
C. Cases the Court Has Decided 
The Court has struggled to determine how to deal with the novel 
issues new technology raises. In case after case involving new 
technology, the Court has tended to proceed cautiously.198 In Fourth 
Amendment, copyright, and telecommunications cases, the Court tends 
to make narrow decisions, expressing concerns about their inability to 
predict how technology—and its corresponding markets—will evolve 
and the need to defer to the political branches. In many of its First 
Amendment cases outside of the telecommunications context, the 
 
 195. Id. at 39. 
 196. Id. at 44. 
 197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 10, 16–17, 23–24, 28–29, 30, 32–33, 52–53, Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-8508.pdf. 
 198. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“[T]he judiciary risks error 
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its 
role in society has become clear.”); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 727, 778 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that given the fast-changing nature of 
telecommunications, the judiciary might be well-advised to heed the proposition: “First, do no harm” 
(quoting the Hippocratic oath)). 
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Court’s caution takes a different form; the Court generally (with some 
notable exceptions) resists calls to revisit its foundational jurisprudential 
principles in the face of new technology, and in the face of technological 
uncertainty, favors speech and eschews deference to the political 
branches. 
The important thing to note about the Court’s decisions, however, is 
that while they reveal some doctrinal confusion about how to deal with 
new technology, they tend to reveal a solid understanding of the 
technology at issue. Of course, the depth of this understanding can vary 
within a single case, where the majority, for example, seems to have a 
solid grip on the technology whereas a concurring or dissenting Justice 
might not. But overall, the Court’s decisions involving new technology 
tend to indicate that the Court is perfectly capable of learning about 
technology when it needs to do so. 
1. Fourth Amendment  
Much ink has been spilled about what to make of the Court’s 
patchwork of decisions involving the Fourth Amendment and new 
technology. Most scholars agree that the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is a mess, although they disagree about whether changing 
technology is the cause of this mess. 
Fourth Amendment questions involving new technology pose classic 
problems of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars have argued that 
the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to searches carried out 
with the use of technology because the Fourth Amendment cannot be 
interpreted to “evolve” the same way technology can without departing 
dramatically from the intent of the founders.199 Justice Black famously 
took this approach in his dissent in Katz, where he refused to go along 
with this majority’s more expansive interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, arguing that it is not “the proper role of this Court to 
rewrite the Amendment in order ‘to bring it into harmony with the 
times.’”200 
Orin Kerr recently argued the Court’s “messy” Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence can be explained best through a theory of “equilibrium 
adjustment.”201 He argues that the Court has created its incoherent body 
 
 199. David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2007). 
 200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 201. Kerr, supra note 13. 
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of Fourth Amendment decisions by reacting to changes in technology or 
social practice that effect the privacy “status quo.” In other words, if 
changes make it easier for the government to obtain evidence (thereby 
cutting into individual’s privacy), it issues decisions restricting that 
practice or the use of that evidence. But if changes make it harder, it 
reaches decisions that tend to restore the government’s power to obtain 
evidence and prosecute crimes—at the expense of privacy. Whatever the 
explanation, it is plain that technological changes have placed pressure 
on the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and contributed to its 
current state of incoherence. 
Perhaps the most famous Fourth Amendment case involving new 
technology is Katz v. United States,202 in which the Court reversed its 
prior holding in Olmstead v. United States203 and held that the Fourth 
Amendment protected against government wiretapping.204 Notably, 
Olmstead itself was decided fifty years after the invention of the 
telephone; the technology was almost one-hundred years old by the time 
of the Katz decision. The Court was able to reach its ultimate conclusion 
only by jettisoning its traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment, 
which required a physical trespass or seizure. The majority took pains to 
note the importance of extending the Fourth Amendment to cover this 
new technology: “[T]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore 
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication.”205 Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence offered the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” framework that has since become so 
important to the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.206 The Court 
has cited Katz’s reversal of Olmstead as an object lesson justifying a 
cautious approach to cases involving new technology.207 
 
 202. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 203. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 204. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
 205. Id. at 352. 
 206. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth a “twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 207. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (citing Olmstead and 
Katz to support the proposition that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear”). 
Ironically, Katz itself may rely on a now-outdated understanding of the importance of the technology 
at issue in that case. These days, few people use public telephones; instead, the use of mobile phones 
is widespread. See Benj Edwards, 10 Victims of Recent Tech, PCMAG.COM (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/2610 35/the-10-victims-of-recent-tech/1. 
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The Court has been most aggressive with its Fourth Amendment 
analysis in cases involving new technology that permits government 
agents to discover information within the interior of the home. The best 
example of this tendency is Kyllo v. United States, in which the Court 
held that the use of thermal imaging constituted a search.208 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Scalia stated that “[w]here the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home 
that previously would have been unknowable without physical intrusion, 
the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unconstitutional without 
a warrant.”209  
Scalia signaled the limited nature of the decision by repeatedly 
emphasizing that the technology at issue in the case was “not in general 
use.”210 This obvious hedging revealed the Court’s concern that over 
time the public’s understanding regarding the reasonable expectation of 
privacy could change along with the technology. Indeed, the Court has 
curbed the protections of the Fourth Amendment based on questionable 
assumptions regarding what technology is in general use or what the 
social norms surrounding the technology are. For example, the Court 
held in California v. Ciraolo that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
a backyard from warrantless surveillance from an airplane,211 even 
though it is hard to imagine that most people have any sort of expectation 
that their backyards would be subject to an aerial—and warrantless—
search at any time.  
In his Kyllo dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for making 
the case more difficult than it had to be. Stevens contended that “[t]here 
is no need for the Court to craft a new rule to decide this case.”212 
Instead, he argued, the case could be resolved simply by distinguishing 
between surveillance inside the home and surveillance outside the 
home.213 Stevens criticized the majority for not focusing more narrowly 
on the technology at issue in the case and attempting to “craft an all-
encompassing rule for the future,” arguing that the Court should let the 
legislature grapple with these issues rather than “shackle them with 
prematurely devised constitutional constraints.”214 
 
 208. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 209. Id. at 40. 
 210. Id. 
 211. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 212. Kyllo,  533 U.S. at 41–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 42. 
 214. Id. at 51. 
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Generally speaking, the Court has followed Justice Stevens’s 
admonition to be cautious in Fourth Amendment cases involving new 
technology. One of the most recent examples of this cautious approach is 
City of Ontario v. Quon, which addressed the Fourth Amendment 
implications of government surveillance of electronic equipment used by 
its employees.215 The Court stated that it “must proceed with care” 
because “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear.”216 The Court was concerned that the 
expectation of privacy that employees reasonably had in their use of 
electronic devices was still evolving; in addition, the Court claimed that a 
narrow holding was appropriate because a broad holding “might have 
implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.”217 Critics 
attacked the Court for taking such a cautious approach to the technology 
at issue in the case, arguing that the social norms relating to pagers—
which have been around for decades—as well as text messaging are 
already sufficiently developed for the Court to resolve whether the 
Fourth Amendment offers any protection for such communications sent 
or received on government-issued devices.218 Furthermore, critics have 
pointed out that the Court’s narrow ruling failed to provide any 
meaningful guidance to employers, employees, the police, and lower 
courts.219 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Quon branded the Court’s 
narrow approach to the Fourth Amendment implications of electronic 
surveillance as “indefensible” because “[t]he-times-they-are-a-changin’ 
is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”220 
In United States v. Jones, the GPS case, the Court likewise issued a 
frustratingly narrow opinion that left open many more questions than it 
answered.221 Rather than decide the case based on whether the GPS 
surveillance offended the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was based on the pre-Katz basis for 
Fourth Amendment violations that depended on some trespass on the 
 
 215. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 216. Id. at 2629. 
 217. Id. at 2630. 
 218. 1. Fourth Amendment—Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 185 
(2010). 
 219. See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Legal Limbo: The Supreme Court’s Discomfort with 
Technology in City of Ontario v. Quon Caused It to Confuse the Definition of a Fourth Amendment 
Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 61, 82 (2011). 
 220. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 221. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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defendant’s property.222 Scalia contended that Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test supplemented rather than added to the 
traditional property-based approach.223 Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion took issue with Scalia’s focus on finding a late eighteenth-
century analog to GPS tracking, offering the following humorous 
footnote: “The Court suggests that something like this might have 
occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a 
very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible 
fortitude and patience.”224 Justice Scalia’s focus on the trespass on 
property rights left open many important questions that seemed to 
concern the Court in oral argument, including the constitutionality of 
obtaining data from a factory-installed GPS device or from cellphones.  
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones expressed particular 
concern about how the Court would approach such future cases, 
especially given the Court’s prior holdings that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect information given to third parties. She suggested that in 
the future the Court might find it “necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” because in the digital 
age, “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”225 Even Justice 
Alito wrote a separate opinion expressing concern about the implications 
for future cases.226 
Scholars have debated whether the Court should proceed cautiously 
in the face of new technology. Orrin Kerr, for example, has argued that 
Congress is in a better position than the courts to generate “rules of 
criminal procedure when technology is changing rapidly” because 
“Congress can legislate comprehensively, updating rules when 
technology changes.”227 Kerr contends that whereas Congress can also 
enact clearer rules, solicit expert input, act when technology is still 
current, and act without a case and controversy requirement, judges are 
 
 222. Id. at 949–53. 
 223. Id. at 950. 
 224. Id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 225. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 226. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Court’s decision “will 
present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making 
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked”). 
 227. Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response to Professor 
Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2005); see also Kerr, supra note 140, at 802. 
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more likely to misunderstand technological issues because they cannot 
solicit outside input and will therefore not know if they have 
misunderstood an issue until after the opinion has been released and 
becomes binding law.228 
Daniel Solove has publicly disagreed with Kerr, arguing that there is 
no reason to believe that Congress is in a better position than the courts 
to handle technological issues and criticizing Kerr’s approach as 
requiring unwarranted deference to legislative bodies.229 Solove points 
out that Congress’s statutes often contain gaps and are out of date, and 
that Congress often fails to act in important areas.230 Solove argues that 
“there is no reason . . . to assume that the average legislator can better 
understand technology than the average judge” and that judges are able 
to understand technologies well enough to deliver thoughtful 
opinions.231 He contends that “[e]xpert testimony or an amicus brief can 
adequately explain technology to judges.”232 
It is not the goal of this Article to resolve whether Solove or Kerr has 
the better argument. Instead, it is simply worth noting that in Fourth 
Amendment cases, the Court has generally taken Kerr’s cautious 
approach to technology. The Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions 
illustrate that the difficulties the Court has resolving issues relating to 
new technology appear to have as much—if not more—to do with 
uncertainty about how to apply the Fourth Amendment to new 
technology than with the Court’s inability to understand the relevant 
technology. That said, the Court as a whole is exceedingly modest about 
its ability to predict the capabilities of new technology, frequently noting 
the limitations of its holdings, and deciding cases as narrowly as 
possible.  
2. Copyright cases 
The Court’s copyright cases involving new technology demonstrate 
that however hazy the Court’s understanding of technology was at oral 
argument, by the time the opinions came out, the Justices had a very 
solid understanding of the technology at issue and were careful to 
 
 228. Kerr, supra note 227, at 783. 
 229. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call 
for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 760–61 (2005). 
 230. Id. at 763–64. 
 231. Id. at 771–72. 
 232. Id. at 772. 
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provide ample breathing space for the technology to grow and develop in 
the future. 
Among the Court’s copyright decisions, its opinions in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.233 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.234 are the two that showcased the Court’s 
commendable understanding of changing technologies. In Sony, the 
copyright holders sued the manufacturer of videocassette recorders, 
claiming that the manufacturer was contributorily liable for the 
infringement that occurred when the owners taped copyrighted programs. 
The Court held that the principal use of the VCR was “time-shifting,” 
i.e., taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient time, which 
the Court concluded was a fair, noninfringing use.235 Justice Stevens’ 
opinion for the Court established a commercially significant safe-harbor 
for new technologies that facilitate private, noncommercial copying.236 
Notably, it was the well-known Luddite Justice Souter who wrote the 
majority opinion in Groskter, and by all accounts he had a firm grip on 
the technology at issue.237 He competently described how peer-to-peer 
networks function as well as the advantages of peer-to-peer networks 
over other kinds of networks. Justice Souter mindfully attempted to 
strike the right balance between innovation and copyright protection,238 
and several years later, it appears he succeeded. Although some have 
criticized the Court for failing to provide a clear standard or test to define 
inappropriate inducement,239 it is clear that the Court’s ruling has not 
 
 233. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 234. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 235. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454–56. 
 236. Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property 
Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1850 (2006). 
 237. See Kermit Roosevelt, Justice Cincinnatus, SLATE (May 1, 2009, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/justice_cincinnatus.html 
(noting that Souter’s opinion in Grokster “won high praise from both the legal and high-tech 
communities”). 
 238. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 (“We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from 
trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and 
unlawful potential.”). 
 239. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of 
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 129 (2010) 
(arguing that Grokster failed to clarify existing law and is open to various interpretations itself); 
Kent Schoen, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster: Unpredictability in Digital Copyright Law, 5 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 156–57 (2006) (criticizing the Grokster decision for targeting only 
clearly advertised infringing intent, thus arming technological innovators with knowledge of how to 
avoid liability in the future); John Borland, Supreme Court Rules Against File Swapping, CNET 
NEWS (June 27, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/Supreme-Court-rules-against-file-swapping/2100-
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stifled technological innovation—the pervasiveness of iPods, Kindles, 
and other electronic devices and products that allow consumers to buy 
and share copyrighted works are proof of this. Indeed, Justice Souter 
seemed comfortable enough with the technology to insert some humor 
into his decision, writing that peer-to-peer technology “has given . . . 
users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though 
their popularity has not been quantified.”240 In another zinger, Justice 
Souter writes, “Users seeking Top 40 songs, for example, or the latest 
release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than those 
seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and Streamcast translated that 
demand into dollars.”241 
Although the Court’s copyright decisions indicate that the Justices 
have a good grasp on the relevant technology, the Court has revealed—as 
it has tended to do in Fourth Amendment cases—a hesitancy to say any 
more than necessary to resolve the case before it. In Sony,242 for 
example, the Court stated that it was reluctant to expand the protections 
of copyright law without clear guidance from Congress because “[s]ound 
policy, as well as history,” demonstrate that “Congress has the 
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully 
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.”243  
Indeed, in his concurring opinion in the Groskter case, Justice Breyer 
wholeheartedly signed on to Professor Kerr’s view that the legislature is 
better situated than the Court to deal with the varied permutations of 
competing interests implicated by new technology.244 He explained, 
“Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about 
present or future technological feasibility or commercial viability where 
technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves 
may radically disagree.”245  
Perhaps most importantly, in copyright cases the Justices are wary of 
how the market will change and develop in response to technological 
 
1030_3-5764135.html.  
 240. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923. 
 241. Id. at 926. Modest Mouse is an indie rock band that was very popular when the case was 
decided in 2005, and The Decameron is a fourteenth-century Italian work containing tales of wit, 
practical jokes, and life lessons. 
 242. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 243. Id. at 431. 
 244. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 245. Id. at 958. 
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developments. In Grokster, for example, the Court took care to explain 
that “[w]e are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on 
regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with 
lawful and unlawful potential.”246 
3. First Amendment cases 
The Court’s approach to changing technology in First Amendment 
cases reveals its struggle to determine whether it needs to revisit its 
doctrinal approach to the constitutional issues presented in light of the 
pressures new technology places on that doctrine.  
 On a few occasions, the Court has dodged some of the more 
complicated questions new technology presents by construing the facts 
narrowly or deciding the case on other grounds. For example, in Snyder 
v. Phelps, the Court declined to include in their analysis the Westboro 
Baptist Church’s online denunciations of the Snyders, explaining that the 
Snyders failed to preserve that issue in their cert petition.247 In support of 
its decision to exclude this material, the Court cited Quon,248 clearly 
indicating that the Court was looking for an excuse to avoid addressing 
the tricky questions online expression raises. In Morse v. Frederick, the 
Court avoided the question of what authority schools have over the 
speech of their students occurring off school grounds—an issue that 
frequently arises with online expression—by concluding that the student 
was participating in a school-sanctioned event during school hours.249 In 
FCC v. Fox, the Court ducked the question of whether changes in 
technology warranted reconsideration of the constitutionality of the 
FCC’s broadcast indecency regulations by holding that the application of 
the regulations in that case violated the networks’ due process rights.250  
The Supreme Court has a mixed record when it comes to questions 
of whether new media is entitled to the same First Amendment 
protections as the old. Historically, the Court has been more receptive to 
 
 246. Id. at 937 (majority opinion). 
 247. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 n.1 (2011). 
 248. Id. (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629–31). The portion of the Quon 
opinion the Court cites has nothing to do with how to construe certiorari petitions but rather 
discusses how the Court must “proceed with care” before addressing “the implications of new 
technology before its role in society has become clear.” See also id. at 1225 n.15 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (taking issue with the Court’s decision to avoid consideration of the “epic”). 
 249. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400–01 (2007). 
 250. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (noting that it was 
unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the indecency policy). 
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arguments that new technology should be treated differently. For 
example, the Supreme Court originally held that the First Amendment 
does not protect motion pictures.251 (The Court later overruled that 
decision.252) Furthermore, the Court has adopted a less robust, medium-
specific First Amendment standard applied to broadcast radio and 
television, evident in both Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC253 and 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.254 
Furthermore, in some of its telecommunications cases, the Court has 
often expressed reluctance to interfere with the findings and predictive 
judgments on which Congress has based its legislation. For example, in 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court majority stated that 
“[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, ‘courts must accord 
substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.’”255 In 
other telecommunications cases, the Court has said that it is appropriate 
to defer to the FCC’s judgment in cases involving subject matter that is 
“technical, complex, and dynamic.”256 
Indeed, the Court’s concerns about technological change have led it 
to proceed cautiously in the telecommunications context. In Denver Area 
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, for example, 
the Court struggled to determine how to approach cable regulation. The 
plurality—Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Souter—held that it was “unwise and unnecessary [to] definitively pick 
one analogy or one specific set of words now,” due to its awareness “of 
the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial 
structure related to telecommunications.”257 Justice Souter’s separate 
concurring opinion in that case echoed the same concerns, noting that in 
 
 251. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915) (characterizing as 
“wrong or strained” the argument that the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment 
applied to motion pictures). 
 252. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 253. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 254. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 255. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). 
 256. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002–03 
(2005); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002); Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (“[T]he broadcast industry is 
dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so 
now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.”). 
 257. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996); see 
also id. at 749 (“[W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which we have 
developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new and changing area.”). 
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cases involving changing technology, “we should be shy about saying 
the final word today about what will be accepted as reasonable 
tomorrow.”258 He proclaimed that in the face of such change, “[the] 
judicial obligation to shoulder [their judicial responsibilities] can itself be 
captured by a much older rule, familiar to every doctor of medicine: 
‘First, do no harm.’”259 Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Ginsburg), 
however, took issue with the plurality’s deference to Congress in cases 
involving emerging technologies.260 He argued that it is not clear that the 
Court minimizes harm when it chooses to uphold rather than strike down 
legislation: “If the plurality is concerned about technology’s direction, it 
ought to begin by allowing speech, not suppressing it.”261 Justice 
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, also took 
the plurality to task for avoiding the appropriate First Amendment 
standard for cable operators.262 
The Court has more recently resisted the government’s arguments for 
less-stringent, medium-specific First Amendment protection for new 
media and has refused to defer to legislative judgment in the face of 
technological uncertainty. From “dial-a-porn”263 and cable television264 
to the Internet,265 “crush” videos,266 and violent video games,267 the 
Court has insisted on applying the full robust protections of the First 
Amendment. In striking down statute after statute, the Court also has 
shown increasing reluctance to defer to legislative judgment even in the 
face of technological uncertainty. The majority position on the Court 
appears to be that when there is any uncertainty about the future of the 
technology, the balance tips in favor of speech. The Court has not shown 
the same reluctance it has demonstrated in its Fourth Amendment cases 
to issue broad rulings, but its First Amendment decisions are 
nevertheless aptly described as cautious. The Court, as a whole, is not 
willing to revisit its foundational jurisprudential principles in the face of 
new technology. 
 
 258. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 259. Id. at 778. 
 260. Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 812–15 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 263. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 264. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 265. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 266. U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 267. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–42 (2011) (applying traditional 
First Amendment principles). 
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It does not appear that any lack of understanding of technology has 
led to the approach the Court has taken to First Amendment cases 
involving new technology. The Court’s first case involving speech on the 
Internet—Reno v. ACLU—was decided fifteen years ago, when the 
technology was in its infancy, and a panicky Congress had passed 
legislation to protect children from pornography online. In order to 
educate the Justices about this technology, the Court library ran training 
sessions, and the law clerks helped teach their bosses. The government 
urged the Court to treat the Internet the same way it had treated broadcast 
television and radio in Pacifica, but it was Justice Stevens, writing for 
the Court, who refused to permit special rules to hamper public discourse 
online. Indeed, one of Justice Stevens’s law clerks from that term told 
Tony Mauro that her Justice “was just as computer-savvy as we 
were.”268 Justice Stevens’s opinion, as well as Justice O’Connor’s 
separate opinion, conveyed a thorough understanding of the Internet as it 
existed at that time.269  
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter again demonstrated a strong 
understanding of how the Internet works in their respective dissenting 
opinions in United States v. American Library Association, which upheld 
a federal law that conditioned library funds on the use of Internet 
filters.270 Relying heavily on the findings of the district court, Justice 
Stevens emphasized the many problems with Internet filters and the 
availability of less restrictive alternatives.271 Stevens took issue with the 
plurality’s conclusion that it would not be significantly burdensome to 
require users to request access to a particular website or the disabling of 
the filters, noting that in most cases a patron would not even know what 
is being hidden from him.272 Justice Souter’s dissent echoed many of 
Justice Stevens’s concerns but also took pains to criticize the plurality’s 
claim that providing limited access to the Internet was equivalent to the 
decisions libraries have to make selecting the books and other materials 
to purchase.273 He noted that “[a]t every significant     point . . . the 
Internet blocking here defies comparison to the process of acquisition”; 
 
 268. Mauro, supra note 112. 
 269. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–53 (1997) (discussing the Internet); id. at 888–91 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the differences between 
cyberspace and speech in “the physical world”). 
 270. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 271. Id. at 221–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. at 224. 
 273. Id. at 235–36 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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for example, a library does not have to be concerned about limited funds 
or space when providing Internet access.274 
The Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association is illustrative of the efforts the Court makes to understand 
new technology.275 Experts believe that the Court did a lot of research 
about videogame technology.276 The Justices’ law clerks most likely also 
played a role in citing games like Kill Screen and GameTrailers.com.277 
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts has publicly confirmed that the Justices 
often do rely on their law clerks to help them understand new 
technology: “That’s one of the great things again with the law clerks. 
They come in and they know how all of this stuff works and what it 
means. And they are a resource for kind of educating those of us who are 
a little bit behind the curve.”278 
At the same time, a close review of Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion in Brown reveals that his understanding of violent video games 
remained weak even after the opinion-writing process. For example, he 
expressed horror that video games would be offered in 3D sometime “in 
the near future,”279 even though some already do have 3D images and in 
many ways are indistinguishable from movies. He also noted that 
“[w]hile the action in older games was often directed with buttons or a 
joystick, players dictate the action in newer games by engaging in the 
same motions that they desire a character in the game to perform.”280 
Justice Alito may have been thinking about Wii—which at the current 
time does not offer the sort of violent video games covered under the 
California statute—and not about all of the video game consoles on the 
market that come with buttons and joysticks. Justice Alito’s opinion also 
refers to games that reenact the Columbine and Virginia Tech 
shootings,281 but these games are not mainstream games (they are 
generally made by nonprofessionals), and they do not contain the sort of 
realistic graphic images of concern to California. 
 
 274. Id. at 236. 
 275. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 276. Nick Summers, Supreme Court Turns Technophile, DAILY BEAST (June 28, 2011, 12:38 
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/28/supreme-court-video-game-decision-is-rare-
tech-savvy-ruling.print.html. 
 277. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748. 
 278. A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts (C-SPAN television broadcast June 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.c-spanarchives.org/clip/1960788. 
 279. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 280. Id. at 2749. 
 281. Id. 
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Perhaps more striking than its understanding of the technology at 
issue in Brown was the majority’s refusal to defer to the California 
legislature’s findings that violent video games are harmful for minors, 
even though video game technology continues to evolve and the effect of 
violent video games on children is currently unclear.282 The Court’s 
broadly sweeping opinion in this case did not reveal the same sense of 
cautious hedging routinely on display in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
cases. 
 
* * * 
 
Cases involving new technology do not present easy answers and 
often place pressure on the relevant pre-existing doctrinal framework; it 
is therefore not surprising that the Court would struggle to understand the 
technology in its efforts to understand how to rule.283 The Justices are 
pretty tech-savvy for baby boomers, and they seem to do their research 
before they rule. If anything, the gap that appears to exist between the 
Justices’ understanding of technology at oral argument and in their 
written decisions may indicate simply that advocates need to do a better 
job of educating the Justices in the first instance so they do not need to 
do so much outside research and rely so heavily on their law clerks. 
 
IV. DISGUST FOR THE MODERN MEDIA CULTURE 
 
Although the Court is cautious when it comes to new 
communications technology, it does not appear that its lack of 
understanding about technology is the reason why it does not permit 
cameras in the courtroom. After all, at this point cameras hardly count as 
“new” technology. 
As the introduction to this Article mentioned, there are probably 
many reasons why some of the individual Justices would prefer to limit 
their exposure in the public eye. But surely one of them is the desire to 
 
 282. Id. at 2733–42 (majority opinion) (holding that video games, including violent video 
games, are entitled to First Amendment protection). Of course, some members of the Court made the 
typical arguments for a more cautious approach. See id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
Court for failing to take a more cautious approach to new technology); see also id. at 2770 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should defer to the legislature, particularly in cases involving 
technical matters). 
 283. As Chief Justice Roberts has quipped: “The impact of the new technology on substantive 
law is really quite significant.” A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, supra note 278, at 40:25. 
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keep the Supreme Court unsullied by the modern media culture. This 
concern runs far deeper than mere vanity, although that may also play a 
role. Justice Ginsburg gave a speech in July 2012 in which she collected 
ten examples of amusing comments from oral arguments in the prior 
Term and concluded, “From the foregoing samples, you may better 
understand why the court does not plan to permit televising oral 
arguments any time soon.”284 
Various members of the Court have expressed doubt that cameras in 
the courtroom would promote public understanding of how the Court 
functions. Indeed, when Justice Alito was asked about cameras in 2007, 
he said that he did not see why access to video was so important given 
that the Court already provides transcripts and audio recordings.285 
Justice Scalia has said that few people would watch the oral arguments 
gavel-to-gavel and instead would see only a thirty-second sound bite that 
would give a distorted image of the proceedings.286 He has also argued 
that “there’s something sick about making entertainment out of real 
people’s legal problems.”287 Retired Justice Souter said that when he had 
been a judge in New Hampshire, camera coverage had affected his 
behavior on the bench because he had believed that some questions 
would be taken out of context on the evening news. The judiciary is not a 
political institution, he said, “nor is it part of the entertainment 
industry.”288 Justice Breyer remarked along the same lines, explaining 
that one reason why there is tension between the Court and the press is 
that the press “specializes in what is interesting” and seeks out cases 
offering a human interest angle, while the Court “has no interest in being 
interesting.”289 
The Court has grappled with excessive media coverage in its own 
cases and confirmation hearings. In Estes v. Texas290 and Sheppard v. 
Maxwell,291 for example, the sensationalistic coverage of notorious 
 
 284. Liptak, supra note 2. 
 285. Tony Mauro, Alito Reflects on His Role on the High Court, LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005488255. 
 286. De Vogue, supra note 1. 
 287. Interview by Maria Bartiromo with Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 
(Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id /9649724/ns/today/t/justice-scalia-says-
not-chance-cameras. 
 288. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body,’ supra note 32. 
 289. Stephen Breyer, Communication Media and Its Relationship with Supreme Courts, 42 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1083, 1085–86 (1998). 
 290. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
 291. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
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murder trials horrified the Court.292 And the media coverage of the O.J. 
Simpson trial was also widely criticized.293 Justice Kennedy apparently 
quipped soon after the trial, “I’m delighted I’m less famous than Judge 
Ito.”294 The confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork and Clarence 
Thomas also offended the Justices and even led retired Justice Thurgood 
Marshall to withdraw his support of cameras in the courtroom.295 
Disgust with modern media culture was evident during oral argument 
in the Court’s most recent case addressing the FCC broadcast indecency 
regulations. There, Justices Kennedy and Scalia discussed the “symbolic 
value” of having broadcast channels free of expletives and nudity, and 
the Chief Justice waxed fondly on the olden days when he said from 
1927 to the mid-1970s there weren’t any nudity or expletives on 
television.296 Chief Justice Roberts argued that the proliferation of cable 
channels means that people have 800 other channels where they go can 
for nudity and expletives.297 Justice Alito expressed concern about what 
people would see on Fox if these guidelines were held 
unconstitutional.298 Justice Breyer noted that Fox was fined because two 
young women “used a fleeting expletive which seems to be naturally part 
of their vocabulary.”299 Justice Kennedy worried that striking down the 
fleeting expletives regulation would cause more celebrities and wanna-be 
celebrities to be free to use profanity, and broadcasters would come to 
expect it “as a matter of course.”300 (Phillips responded that you would 
see people using the language they normally use, which increasingly 
includes vulgarity.301) Justice Scalia helpfully suggested that in addition 
to using “bleeping” technology and imposing a scienter requirement, a 
third option for broadcasters is that they “shouldn’t interview these 
people” likely to use profanity.302 In the opinion the Court ultimately 
issued in the case, the Court made a subtle dig at the content at issue by  
 
 
 292. Mauro, supra note 4, at 262. 
 293. Id. at 263. 
 294. Tony Mauro, The Camera-Shy Federal Courts, 12 MEDIA STUD. J. 60, 63 (1998). 
 295. Mauro, supra note 4, at 266. 
 296. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 180, at 22. 
 297. Id. at 28. 
 298. Id. at 29. 
 299. Id. at 31. 
 300. Id. at 35. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 56. 
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referring to a presenter at the Billboard Music Awards who used a 
profanity as “a person named Nicole Ritchie.”303  
Indeed, one of the real reasons the Court is hostile to cameras in the 
courtroom may be precisely because it does understand all too well that 
technology is powerful and unpredictable. Perhaps the Justices are 
protecting themselves and the institution from misunderstandings that 
would likely be created and cemented by video. It is not difficult to 
imagine a remark, taken out of context, used over and over again to 
impugn the court, argue for its weakening, or to foment fundamental 
change (e.g., for elected judges or judicial term limits). If all we have is 
written transcript, the visceral impact of the misperception is much 
harder to create and maintain. The Justices may feel that it is better to 
leave things as they are than run the risk of technology in the courtroom, 
which is hard to control and unpredictable. In short, technology would 
disrupt the Court’s control over its perception by the public, and the 
Justices do not want to lose that control. 
Given what appears to be a Court concerned about how video will 
pervert public understanding of the Court’s functioning, we still may be a 
long way off from having cameras in the courtroom. This hardly 
suggests, however, that there are not other ways that the Court could use 
to improve its communications with the public. This is not to minimize 
the value of video, but it simply recognizes that there are other 
potentially valuable ways of improving the way the Court interacts with 
the public. Once we can focus on what alternative technologies would be 
valuable, then the Bar and the press should undertake an effort to educate 
the Court about these technologies, just as lawyers (ideally) do when 
they are arguing cases with new technology before the Court. 
Short of permitting cameras in the courtroom, there are a number of 
other initiatives the Court could undertake that would not interfere with 
the Court’s ability to control its public image but would make it easier 
for reporters to cover the Court and for the general public to understand 
the Court’s work. One obvious solution would be to make the audio of 
the oral argument available immediately; better yet, the Court could offer 
live streaming audio. Given that the Court already releases audio 
recordings of its oral arguments, the only thing this suggestion would 
change, if implemented, is the timing of these releases. Although 
releasing audio the day of oral argument might increase the use of the 
Justices’ voices in media coverage of the cases under consideration, bare 
 
 303. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2314 (2012). 
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audio recordings—without accompanying video—are less valuable for 
television broadcasts and, as a result, much less likely to lead to turning 
the Court’s work into the sort of “entertainment” in the way that the 
Justices apparently fear. 
In addition, the Court should release the audio recordings of the 
opinion announcements immediately (again, live-streaming would be 
preferable) and make them easily accessible on the Court’s own website. 
The Court could also improve the accessibility of its own website. At the 
moment, the website lists cases by Term, and by case-name only. It 
would be very helpful for the press and public alike if the website gave 
some indication regarding the type of case, the question presented, and 
the holding. 
Advocates for increased public access to the Court’s work should 
urge the Court to harness the power of the social media. The first step is 
to educate the Court that using social media does not mean that the 
individual Justices need to start opening Facebook and Twitter accounts 
to communicate on a daily basis for the public. Instead, the Court itself 
could use various social media platforms to distribute the Court’s 
opinions and orders, oral argument transcripts, and oral argument audio. 
The Court could also help improve press coverage in a number of 
ways. For example, the Court could reinstitute its policy of e-mailing the 
opinions to the press corps, particularly in high-profile cases, in case the 
Court’s website becomes inaccessible. Congress and the Court alike 
should also carefully consider how it could revise its press access 
policies to account for changes in the media environment. Although it 
seems unlikely that the Court will give the press advance notice of which 
opinions are coming down, the Court could continue to work on its 
efforts to spread out the announcement of high-profile cases and to 
refrain from announcing decisions on the same day as oral argument. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article took on the common argument that the Supreme Court 
does not embrace the full range of communication media available 
because it does not like, or does not understand, new technology. A 
review of the Justices’ personal use of technology, statements at oral 
argument, and treatment of technology in written opinions reveals that 
although the Justices are generally not technophiles, they are not hostile 
to new technology but perhaps a little concerned about its impact. The 
Court is generally cautious when it approaches issues involving new 
technology, and this cautious attitude is reflected in its approach to using 
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technology to communicate with the public. At the same time, it is clear 
that the Justices are perfectly able to understand and appreciate 
technology. This Article concludes that advocates for improved public 
communications from the Court should move beyond its rather myopic 
focus on cameras on the courtroom and consider educating the Court 
about other ways in which the Court could improve its communications 
with the press and public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
08.PAPANDREA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2013 8:44 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1952 
 
 
